Abstract:The recent growing diffusion of dispersed generation in low voltage (LV) distribution networks is entailing new rules to make local generators participate in network stability. Consequently, national and international grid codes, which define the connection rules for stability and safety of electrical power systems, have been updated requiring distributed generators and electrical storage systems to supply stabilizing contributions. In this scenario, specific attention to the uncontrolled islanding issue has to be addressed since currently required anti-islanding protection systems, based on relays locally measuring voltage and frequency, could no longer be suitable. In this paper, the effects on the interface protection performance of different LV generators' stabilizing functions are analysed. The study takes into account existing requirements, such as the generators' active power regulation (according to the measured frequency) and reactive power regulation (depending on the local measured voltage). In addition, the paper focuses on other stabilizing features under discussion, derived from the medium voltage (MV) distribution network grid codes or proposed in the literature, such as fast voltage support (FVS) and inertia emulation. Stabilizing functions have been reproduced in the DIgSILENT PowerFactory 2016 software environment, making use of its native programming language. Later, they are tested both alone and together, aiming to obtain a comprehensive analysis on their impact on the anti-islanding protection effectiveness. Through dynamic simulations in several network scenarios the paper demonstrates the detrimental impact that such stabilizing regulations may have on loss-of-main protection effectiveness, leading to an increased risk of unintentional islanding.

Single-phase-to-ground faults may cause substantial temporary overvoltages (TOVs) in large radial medium-voltage networks with isolated neutral, even over 3-p.u. phase to ground. Resonant neutral earthing limits these overvoltages to 1.8 p.u. but credible earthing apparatus failures might trigger TOVs up to 2.4 p.u. This paper presents the ground fault study of an Italian 20-kV ENEL Distribuzione network. Analytical evaluations in a wide parametric range of neutral earthing arrangements, include isolated neutral and ENEL resonant earthing with parallel resistance, as evidence of 2.4-p.u. TOVs with isolated neutral, 1.8 p.u. with resonant earthing, and more than 2.0 p.u. with partial compensation. Recordings of ground faults staged in the same network are presented, showing excellent agreement between analytical predictions and experimental test. The tests confirm TOVs of more than 2.3 p.u. with isolated neutral, sometimes evolving into cross-country faults (possibly explaining unforeseen cable fault rates), and the effectiveness of the ENEL neutral earthing practices in suppressing these TOVs.

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