This article examines national parliamentarians’ approval of the increased budgetary capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in autumn 2011. Following the analysis of vote outcome and plenary debates in 11 euro states, it is found that the financial position of a state (creditors versus debtors) does not explain the patterns of support and opposition. Rather, two other factors account for these differences: Euroscepticism, and the government and opposition cleavage. In particular, whereas Eurosceptic MPs voted and argued against the EFSF, the parliamentary majorities supported it. Surprisingly, although the legal basis of the EFSF draws on solidarity among the European Union Member States, the supporters of the EFSF did not refer to this principle in their speeches but rather to pragmatic considerations such as national economic interests.

Are we all austerians now? An analysis of national parliamentary parties' positioning on anti-crisis measures in the eurozone * Aleksandra MaatschABSTRACT Which factors account for positioning of national parliamentary parties on anti-crisis measures implemented in the bailout states of the eurozone? The literature suggests that parties representing the economic 'left' are more likely to advocate Keynesian measures, whereas parties representing the economic 'right' tend to support the neoliberal ones. However, the current political discourse suggests that the choice of anti-crisis policies rather reflects the conflict of interests between euro states that received a bailout (debtors) and those who only provided financial guarantees (creditors). The empirical findings, based on (1) discourse analysis of national parliamentary debates and (2) the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) model (crisp set), demonstrate that -next to the economic stance of a partyreceipt of a bailout also accounts for parliamentary parties' positioning on anticrisis measures. In particular, parliamentary parties in debtor states are likely to opt for Keynesian anti-crisis measures despite their right-wing economic stance or membership in the government.

MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland. While in France and Germany, compliance within the European Semester has been subject to strong politicization, this has not been the case in Austria and Ireland. Moreover, strong politicization coincided with the contestation of country-specific recommendations among the parliamentary parties. The empirical analysis established that strong formal powers in budgetary matters constitute an important prerequisite allowing parliamentary parties to articulate their contestation. However, the willingness to comply depends most directly on whether the content of country-specific recommendations is coherent with the economic preferences of a political party, not the government-opposition cleavage. Keywords

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