Background Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) poses a high risk of transmission in close-contact indoor settings, which may include households. Prior studies have found a wide range of household secondary attack rates and may contain biases due to simplifying assumptions about transmission variability and test accuracy. Methods We compiled serological SARS-CoV-2 antibody test data and prior SARS-CoV-2 test reporting from members of 9,224 Utah households. We paired these data with a probabilistic model of household importation and transmission. We calculated a maximum likelihood estimate of the importation probability, mean and variability of household transmission probability, and sensitivity and specificity of test data. Given our household transmission estimates, we estimated the threshold of non-household transmission required for epidemic growth in the population. Results We estimated that individuals in our study households had a 0.41% (95% CI 0.32%– 0.51%) chance of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 infection outside their household. Our household secondary attack rate estimate was 36% (27%– 48%), substantially higher than the crude estimate of 16% unadjusted for imperfect serological test specificity and other factors. We found evidence for high variability in individual transmissibility, with higher probability of no transmissions or many transmissions compared to standard models. With household transmission at our estimates, the average number of non-household transmissions per case must be kept below 0.41 (0.33–0.52) to avoid continued growth of the pandemic in Utah. Conclusions Our findings suggest that crude estimates of household secondary attack rate based on serology data without accounting for false positive tests may underestimate the true average transmissibility, even when test specificity is high. Our finding of potential high variability (overdispersion) in transmissibility of infected individuals is consistent with characterizing SARS-CoV-2 transmission being largely driven by superspreading from a minority of infected individuals. Mitigation efforts targeting large households and other locations where many people congregate indoors might curb continued spread of the virus.

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Antibiotic overuse has promoted the spread of antibiotic resistance. To compound the issue, treating individuals dually infected with antibiotic-resistant and antibiotic-vulnerable strains can make their infections completely resistant through competitive release. We formulate mathematical models of transmission dynamics accounting for dual infections and extensions accounting for lag times between infection and treatment or between cure and ending treatment. Analysis using the Next-Generation Matrix reveals how competition within hosts and the costs of resistance determine whether vulnerable and resistant strains persist, coexist, or drive each other to extinction. Invasion analysis predicts that treatment of dually infected cases will promote resistance. By varying antibiotic strength, the models suggest that physicians have two ways to achieve a particular resistance target: prescribe relatively weak antibiotics to everyone infected with an antibiotic-vulnerable strain or give more potent prescriptions to only those patients singly infected with the vulnerable strain after ruling out the possibility of them being dually infected with resistance. Through selectivity and moderation in antibiotic prescription, resistance might be limited.

The future prevalence and virulence of SARS-CoV-2 is uncertain. Some emerging pathogens become avirulent as populations approach herd immunity. Although not all viruses follow this path, the fact that the seasonal coronaviruses are benign gives some hope. We develop a general mathematical model to predict when the interplay among three factors, correlation of severity in consecutive infections, population heterogeneity in susceptibility due to age, and reduced severity due to partial immunity, will promote avirulence as SARS-CoV-2 becomes endemic. Each of these components has the potential to limit severe, high-shedding cases over time under the right circumstances, but in combination they can rapidly reduce the frequency of more severe and infectious manifestation of disease over a wide range of conditions. As more reinfections are captured in data over the next several years, these models will help to test if COVID-19 severity is beginning to attenuate in the ways our model predicts, and to predict the disease.

Background An intervention that successfully reduced colonization and infection with carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) in Chicago-area long-term acute-care hospitals included active surveillance and contact precautions. However, the specific effects of contact precautions applied to surveillance-detected carriers on patient-to-patient transmission are unknown, as other, concurrent intervention components or changes in facility patient dynamics also could have affected the observed outcomes. Methods Using previously published data from before and after the CPE intervention, we designed a mathematical model with an explicit representation of postintervention surveillance. We estimated preintervention to postintervention changes of 3 parameters: β, the baseline transmission rate excluding contact precaution effects; δb, the rate of a CPE carrier progressing to bacteremia; and δc, the progression rate to nonbacteremia clinical detection. Results Assuming that CPE carriers under contact precautions transmit carriage to other patients at half the rate of undetected carriers, the model produced no convincing evidence for a postintervention change in the baseline transmission rate β (+2.1% [95% confidence interval {CI}, −18% to +28%]). The model did find evidence of a postintervention decrease for δb (−41% [95% CI, −60% to −18%]), but not for δc (−7% [95% CI, −28% to +19%]). Conclusions Our results suggest that contact precautions for surveillance-detected CPE carriers could potentially explain the observed decrease in colonization by itself, even under conservative assumptions for the effectiveness of those precautions for reducing cross-transmission. Other intervention components such as daily chlorhexidine gluconate bathing of all patients and hand-hygiene education and adherence monitoring may have contributed primarily to reducing rates of colonized patients progressing to bacteremia.