The increasing degree of connectivity in factory of the future (FoF) environments, with systems that were never designed for a networked environment in terms of their technical security nature, is accompanied by a number of security risks that must be considered. This leads to the necessity of relying on risk assessment-based approaches to reach a sufficiently mature cyber security management level. However, the lack of common definitions of cyber threat actors (CTA) poses challenges in untested environments such as the FoF. This paper analyses policy papers and reports from expert organizations to identify common definitions of CTAs. A significant consensus exists only on two common CTAs, while other CTAs are often either ignored or overestimated in their importance. The identified motivations of CTAs are contrasted with the specific characteristics of FoF environments to determine the most likely CTAs targeting FoF environments. Special emphasis is given to corporate competitors, as FoF environments probably provide better opportunities than ever for industrial espionage if they are not sufficiently secured. In this context, the study aims to draw attention to the research gaps in this area.

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Production systems are changing in many aspects on the way to a Factory of the Future, including the level of automation and communication between components. Besides all benefits, this evolution raises the amount, effect and type of anomalies and unforeseen behavior to a new level of complexity. Thus, new detection and mitigation concepts are required. Based on a use-case dealing with a distributed transportation system for production environments, this paper describes the different sources of possible anomalies with the same effect, anomaly detection methods and related mitigation techniques. Depending on the identified anomaly, the FoF should react accordingly, such as fleet or AGV reconfiguration, strong authentication and access control or a deletion of adversarial noises. In this paper, different types of mitigation actions are described that support the fleet in overcoming the effect of the anomaly or preventing them in the future. A concept to select the most appreciate mitigation method is presented, where the detection of the correct source of the anomaly is key. This paper shows how various techniques can work together to gain a holistic view on anomalies in the Factory of the Future for selecting the most appropriate mitigation technique.