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Increasing product life allows the embodied emissions in products to be spread across a longer period but can mean that opportunities to improve use-phase efficiency are foregone. In this paper, a model that evaluates this trade-off is presented and used to estimate the optimal product life for a range of metal-intensive products. Two strategies that have potential to save emissions are explored: (1) adding extra embodied emissions to make products more sturdy, increasing product life, and (2) increasing frequency of use, causing early product failure to take advantage of improvements in use-phase efficiency. These strategies are evaluated for two specific case studies (long-life washing machines and more frequent use of vehicles through car clubs) and for a range of embodied and use-phase intensive products under different use-phase improvement rate assumptions. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that products often fail neither at their design life nor at their optimal life. Policy recommendations are then made regarding the targeting of these strategies according to product characteristics and the timing of typical product failure relative to optimal product life.

Material efficiency is indispensable to reaching agreed targets for industry's energy and carbon emissions. Yet, in the EU, the energy-and emissions-saving potentials of this strategy continue to be framed as secondary outcomes of resource-related policies. Understanding why material efficiency has been overlooked as an energy/climate solution is a prerequisite for proposing ways of changing its framing, but existing studies have failed to do so. This paper fills this gap by triangulating interviews, policy documents and three policy theories: namely, historical and rational choice institutionalism, and multiple streams framework. Factors discouraging material efficiency as an energy and climate strategy include: difficulties in reframing the prevailing rationale to pursue it; the inadequacy of monitored indicators; the lack of high-level political buy-in from DG Energy and Clima; the ETS policy lock-in; uncoordinated policy management across Directorates; the lack of a designated industry lobby. Policy solutions are proposed. Before 2030, these are limited to minor amendments, e.g. guidance on embodied energy calculations or industry standards. Post-2030, more radical interventions are possible, such as introducing new fiscal drivers, redesigning the ETS emissions cap or benchmarks for allowances. This evidence suggests that the transition to a low-carbon industry will require Member State-and industry-level action.

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