Russia has a widespread injection drug use epidemic with high prevalence of HIV and HCV among people who inject drugs (PWID). We conducted a mixed methods study of young (age 18–26) hard drug users in St. Petersburg. Thirty-nine structured and 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted. No HIV cases and two HCV cases were detected among the PWID subsample (n=29). Amphetamine and other stimulants were common (70%), opioid use was rare and episodic. Consistent condom use was 10%. No PWID reported syringe-sharing, 51% reported other drug paraphernalia sharing. Most (89%) never or rarely communicated with older (30+) opiate users. A new cohort of drug users in St. Petersburg may have emerged, which is much safer in its injection practices compared to previous cohorts. However, risky sexual practices among this new cohort may expose them to the possibility of sexual transmission of HIV and widespread drug paraphernalia sharing to the HCV epidemic.

No abstract

No abstract

According to Dante, “Limbo” is the first circle of Hell located at its edge. Unlike other residents of Hell, the Limbo population suffers no torment other than their lack of hope. We argue that a lack of hope in post-Soviet Ukraine is expressed by a lack of conditions for a better future since the past is overrepresented in the present. Therefore, every movement transforms under the past’s pressure, changing its course in order to reproduce and perpetuate ghosts of what is long gone. We argue that the current state of Ukraine can be framed as “post-Soviet limbo.” If the great stability of the Soviet regime was a result of overregulation and extensive control, or of “uncertainty avoidance,” then a post-Soviet limbo is a result of “managing uncertainty” simultaneously influenced by Soviet legacies and neoliberal promises of growth, calculability, and deregulation on the part of the State. “Soviet legacies” are dominant and represent a mix of formal overregulation explicitly presented through laws and policies and informality which, according to some authors, became even more widespread in the post-Soviet period than it used to be under the Soviet rule. We do not aim to consider the past legacies as being opposite to neoliberal features and futures, but negotiate the way the two are interrelated and mutually reinforced in the present to produce the post-Soviet limbo. Ukraine’s performance of Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT) coverage is consistently estimated as insufficient and needing further improvement. However, we argue that that there are two modes of OAT implementation in Ukraine: state-funded (formal) and privately-funded (informal). The latter’s size does not fall into official estimates since the national reports on OAT performance never include the numbers of patients involved in informal treatment. We suggest, that the informal mode of OAT implementation appeared as a result of contrasting efforts towards intensive regulation and extensive growth. To understand how these two modes are produced in the context of post-Soviet narcology, how they differ and where their paths cross, we analyze two types of texts: legal and policy documents regulating substance use disorder (SUD) treatment, mainly OAT; and qualitative data, including interviews with OAT patients and field notes reflecting the environment of OAT programs. Finally, the presented article seeks to answer how the state’s contrasting efforts to manage the uncertainty of SUD treatment through OAT regulation and implementation reproduce the post-Soviet limbo and, thus, people with SUD as “patients of the state” who are frozen in a hopeless wait for changes.

This chapter considers pension protection and social services in the post-Soviet space as forms of social policy that can protect older people from risks of social exclusion. We draw on the example of two countries, Russia and Ukraine, which share a common Soviet background. Until relatively recently, both countries held a similar position with regard to the pension protection and social security of old people. However, recent reforms in the area of pensions and social services have generated various possible ways for the development of both countries. In Ukraine, pension reform took place in 2017, and can be described as “softer” in comparison with the Russian version. Ukrainian reform does not involve raising the retirement age, but rather increases the length of service required to retire. Pension reform in Russia has been taking place before our eyes, in 2018–2019. It assumes a sharp rise in the retirement ages for men and women. In addition to addressing pension reform, the chapter considers in more detail social services for older people in Russia and Ukraine. In broad terms, the chapter seeks to answer the following question: How do modern pension reforms and the structure of social services in the post-Soviet space (for example, Russia and Ukraine) affect the social exclusion of older people?