Why do many States in transitional economies lack the regulative capacities to evenly distribute property rights among emerging private firms resulting in having public good devoured by particularistic interests? I argue that uneven distribution of property rights is deeply embedded within broader power relations permeating political regimes. This study attempts to develop the concept of politically-embedded cronyism where State incumbents generate and protract uneven distribution of property rights in favor of a few private actors as tactics of regime survival that go beyond the mere interest of self-enrichment as the capture thesis would argue. Politically-embedded cronyism is likely to emerge the more State incumbents retain their relative autonomy from their cronies through higher concentration of power in the executive, less role of societal groups in general and business in particular in the reproduction of the power of top incumbents and higher public asset retention in the post-liberalization period in addition to possessing channels of political incorporation to fledging business.

To the surprise of many in the West, the fall of the USSR in 1991 did not lead to the adoption of liberal democratic government around the world and the much anticipated “end of history.” In fact, authoritarianism has made a comeback, and liberal democracy has been on the retreat for at least the last 15 years culminating in the unthinkable: the invasion of a democratic European country by an authoritarian regime. But why does authoritarianism continue to spread, not only as an alternative to liberal democracy, but also within many liberal democracies where authoritarian leaders continue to gain strength and popularity? In this curated piece, contributors discuss some of the potential contributions of management scholarship to understanding authoritarianism, as well as highlight a number of directions for management research in this area.

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