Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. Terms of use: Documents inThe papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments.The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank. Adjusting for Information Content when Comparing ForecastSveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 328Abstract Cross institutional forecast evaluations may be severely distorted by the fact that forecasts are made at different points in time, and thus with different amount of information. This paper proposes a method to account for these differences. The method computes the timing effect and the forecaster's ability simultaneously. Monte Carlo simulation demonstrate that evaluations that do not adjust for the differences in information content may be misleading. In addition, the method is applied on a real-world data set of 10 Swedish forecasters for the period 1999-2015. The results show that the ranking of the forecasters is affected by the proposed adjustment.

This paper documents the existence of Political Forecast Cycles. In a theoretical model of political selection, we show that governments release overly optimistic GDP growth forecasts ahead of elections to increase the reelection probability. The bias arises from lack of commitment if voters are rational and from manipulation of voters' beliefs if they do not expect the incumbent to be biased. Using high-frequency forecaster-level data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, we document that governments overestimate short-term GDP growth by 10 to 13 percent during campaign periods.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. Terms of use: Documents inThe papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments.The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank. Adjusting for Information Content when Comparing ForecastSveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 328Abstract Cross institutional forecast evaluations may be severely distorted by the fact that forecasts are made at different points in time, and thus with different amount of information. This paper proposes a method to account for these differences. The method computes the timing effect and the forecaster's ability simultaneously. Monte Carlo simulation demonstrate that evaluations that do not adjust for the differences in information content may be misleading. In addition, the method is applied on a real-world data set of 10 Swedish forecasters for the period 1999-2015. The results show that the ranking of the forecasters is affected by the proposed adjustment.