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We take advantage of the gradual implementation of a comprehensive mandatory food labeling regulation introduced in Chile to identify its effects on consumer behavior. Using individual-level scandata from transactions in a big-box supermarket, we estimate a demand model for differentiated products in which a food label indicator captures the warning label effect. We find sizable effects on juices and cereals, but no impact on chocolates & candies and cookies. Our results are consistent with the information disclosure being effective only when information is unexpected.

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The paper examines a large-scale mandatory food labeling regulation to identify its effects on consumer behavior.

Conventional wisdom is that big‐box retailers squeeze the profits of small suppliers. Underlying this belief is the assumption that relative market size is the primary source of bargaining leverage. Using actual wholesale prices, we study profit‐sharing between large retailers and suppliers of different size. We find that the median supplier earns 42% of the channel surplus, and that some very small suppliers attain a share of the channel surplus close to that of the largest supplier (about 68%). Using a Nash bargaining model, we find that small suppliers can gain bargaining leverage by maintaining a base of loyal customers.