Linear models reach their limitations in applications with nonlinearities in the data. In this paper new empirical evidence is provided on the relative Euro inflation forecasting performance of linear and non-linear models. The well established and widely used univariate ARIMA and multivariate VAR models are used as linear forecasting models whereas neural networks (NN) are used as non-linear forecasting models. It is endeavoured to keep the level of subjectivity in the NN building process to a minimum in an attempt to exploit the full potentials of the NN. It is also investigated whether the historically poor performance of the theoretically superior measure of the monetary services flow, Divisia, relative to the traditional Simple Sum measure could be attributed to a certain extent to the evaluation of these indices within a linear framework. Results obtained suggest that non-linear models provide better within-sample and out-of-sample forecasts and linear models are simply a subset of them. The Divisia index also outperforms the Simple Sum index when evaluated in a non-linear framework.

This paper identifies the key institutional factors that influence loan loss rates in Community Development Finance Institutions in the UK. Traditional bank credit assessment puts the blame of poor loan performance largely on the borrower. This is the first study of its kind to examine institutional characteristics of 16 CDFIs in the UK and assess their influence on the loan loss rates. The results show that 8 out of the 13 institutional characteristics examined significantly influence loan repayment performance. Although a vast body of literature supports the view that borrower characteristics are highly influential, our results provide strong evidence to show that institutional characteristics are equally important and both factors need to be taken into account if loan repayment performance is to be improved.

Post 1992 Cadbury Committee report developments in UK corporate governance provisions are reviewed. The role of institutional investors, and the financial sector as a whole, in corporate governance is considered. Practices in "Continental Europe", the UK and the US are contrasted, along with the roles of banks, strategic investors ("insiders"), institutional investors ("outsiders") and capital markets. To be effective, capital markets must be efficient and competitive and auditing must be reliable. Current EU and US reform proposals are compared and prospects for convergence in corporate governance procedures assessed.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to consider the case for regulating financial innovation in light of the recent global financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach -Responsibility for assuring the bank customers are "treated fairly" in the UK currents belongs to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), whilst the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) oversees the Consumer Credit Act. The paper argues for the regulation of retail banking and financial service provision as a utility, leaving the FSA to concentrate on prudential supervision and the OFT to concentrate on its other responsibilities. Financial innovation in wholesale and investment banking should be regulated by the prudential authorities. Findings -New financial instruments are frequently underpriced, which may be in part to encourage rapid and widespread adoption. Practical implications -Good, transactions cost and risk reducing, retail financial innovation should be encouraged. New wholesale financial products should be thoroughly "stress tested" prior to being licensed, analogous to the testing of new medical "drugs" by the pharmaceutical industry. Originality/value -The global banking crisis led to calls for banks to maintain lending to smalland medium-sized enterprises and households (especially mortgages). This implies that access to finance, like access to water and electricity, should be assured and that customers should be protected against the "monopoly" powers of large suppliers. Hence, retail banks are utilities and should be regulated as such.

PurposeTo consider the implications of the banks fiduciary duty to their depositors (as well as the shareholders) and the government's fiscal duty to taxpayers (in the presence of deposit insurance) for the corporate governance (CG) of banks.Design/methodology/approachRecent contributions to the literature are outlined and assessed in the context of the asymmetric information literature relating to banking.FindingsThe good CG of banks requires regulation to balance the interests of depositors and taxpayers with those of the shareholders.Originality/valueLinking the bank regulation in literature based on information asymmetry to the CG literature.