Systematic data on annual infant mortality rates are of use to a variety of social science research programs in demography, economics, sociology, and political science. Infant mortality rates may be used both as a proxy measure for economic development, in lieu of energy consumption or GDP-per-capita measures, and as an indicator of the extent to which governments provide for the economic and social welfare of their citizens. Until recently, data were available for only a limited number of countries based on regional or country-level studies and time periods for years after 1950. Here, the authors introduce a new dataset reporting annual infant mortality rates for all states in the world, based on the Correlates of War state system list, between 1816 and 2002. They discuss past research programs using infant mortality rates in conflict studies and describe the dataset by exploring its geographic and temporal coverage. Next, they explain some of the limitations of the dataset as well as issues associated with the data themselves. Finally, they suggest some research areas that might benefit from the use of this dataset. This new dataset is the most comprehensive source on infant mortality rates currently available to social science researchers.

Existing work cannot explain why countries form alliances when direct security threats are not a key political issue, though we know countries routinely do engage in that behavior. Countries form alliances to manage the essential problem that they must use finite budget resources to provide social policy and national security; the 'guns versus butter' dilemma. States ally to 'contract out' national security via the formation of alliance contracts so they can allocate more resources to domestic concerns. Alliances increase the efficiency of security policy by providing the same level of security with fewer resources, thus freeing those resources for use in other domains. Not only should alliances form when security threats do not dominate the political agenda, but also domestic political and economic demands will influence alliance decisions. In positing a domestic politics-based explanation for alliance formation, this article argues that increased demands for social policy goods increase the chances of alliance formation as leaders seek greater policy allocation efficiency. The use of a production possibilities frontier illustrates the central argument. Those claims are examined on a sample of all country-years from 1816-2000 using a probit model. Empirical results suggest changes in the demand for social policy goods, operationalized as changes in the infant mortality rate, are an important cause of alliance behavior.

Existing research on the connection between alliance formation and conflict initiation has explicitly focused on the direct effect of alliances on conflict by including some measure of alliance behavior as an independent variable in models of conflict behavior. Existing research misspecifies the relationship between alliances and conflict, because alliance formation and conflict initiation are shaped by many of the same factors (in particular, regime type and capabilities), and alliance formation decisions are endogenous to conflict initiation decisions. Thus, alliance formation and conflict initiation should be modeled in a system of equations where a set of variables shapes alliance formation and conflict directly, and indirectly affects conflict through the decision to ally. The author estimates a two-equation probit model that accounts for the endogenous nature of alliance formation decisions and, thus, for the indirect effects of variables like regime and power on conflict. Results suggest that the effect of regime on alliance behavior differs across time periods. Finally, the model provides evidence that the total effects of variables like power and regime on conflict are, in fact, mediated by how those variables influence the decision to ally.

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