This paper provides a legal analysis of some of the key issues that arise in examining the system for allocating emissions allowances under the EU's Emissions Trading System Directive. There is a strong series of arguments in support of the view that the free allocation of allowances under the various NAPs involves an element of State aid, which has neither been formally notified to, nor cleared by, the Commission under the EC Treaty. Even if it is found properly to have been notified, there are serious doubts as to whether the extent of aid granted satisfies the proportionality principle. As a result, the operation of the EU ETS may be subject to some legal uncertainty with regard to possible legal challenges to the current allocation of allowances. Going forward, proposals to amend the operation of the EU ETS must take into account similar State aid considerations (particularly proportionality) and the experience gained from the working of the EU ETS in Phase I. The structural outline of a possible legislative package has been suggested, which could achieve the safeguarding of commercial and legal certainty under the current allocation regime, while at the same time providing a basis for amendment of the allocation mechanism under the EU ETS for Phase II or beyond.

Renewables require support policies to deliver the European 20% target. We discuss the requirements for least cost development and efficient operation and quantify how different schemes (i) allow for the development of a renewable energy technology portfolio; (ii) reduce rent transfers to infra-marginal technologies or better than marginal resource bases; and (iii) minimise regulatory risk and thus capital costs for new projects. Long-term take or pay contracts minimise regulatory uncertainty, create appropriate incentives for location and operation, allow for efficient system operation and seem compatible with European state aid. We discuss how property rights legislation protects existing renewables investors, and thus can ensure ongoing investment during a transition towards the new scheme.

This article focuses on reviewing energy law education in the UK. For such a fast-growing discipline it is important to reflect on the features that give cohesiveness to its curriculum development: how it is taught; who is teaching it and where it is being taught; and what content is given to the curriculum offered? Is it, for example, national in focus or international, or both? A recent review on the state of energy law education in the US demonstrates the scale and ambition of energy law education in that country. This article complements that exercise by providing a review of energy law education in the UK as at 2016. By comparing and contrasting the two approaches, we can glean some distinctive features of the UK approach. More research is needed on energy law education but from this article it is clear that energy law has taken a foothold in legal education in the UK.

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The internal market for electricity and gas, which European Union (EU) Member States were to have completed by 2014, is intended to deliver real choice for all consumers and achieve competitive prices. Today's reality is often the opposite: despite the advanced liberalization of the energy sector, and formal market opening in line with the EU energy acquis, several Member States continue to regulate retail energy prices. In the short term, price regulation is not necessarily bad for customers. Retail prices are regulated below 'real' costs so that customers benefit from artificially low prices. However, in the long term, price regulation dissuades customers from seeking better deals, and acts as a barrier preventing energy suppliers from entering the market. From a legal point of view, regulated energy prices also give rise to concerns. This article will show that State interference runs counter to the liberalization objective of the EU rules on the internal energy market and may, in particular cases, also involve State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. It will be shown that these EU rules proceed from price-setting on a free market and competitive basis, while State intervention is allowed only in exceptional and specifically justified circumstances. Other EU legal provisions address competition in the sector too, such as collusion, abuse of dominance and merger control: our focus here is to show that other instruments under the broad umbrella of competition law are also crucial in developing and protecting the competitive process. The European Commission is therefore right in insisting on phase-out timetables for regulated energy prices and continuing to promote market-based price formation.