This article studies the relevance of psychological biases and heuristics in the context of foresight and scenario processes. Though there is extensive literature studying cognitive mechanisms from the psychological side, discussions on the application of these findings in the foresight context, and more specifically with regard to specific steps of the scenario method, are rare. Some studies focus on a potential debiasing effect of scenario processes and do not examine the role biases and heuristics play during the process. We address this gap drawing from empirical research and practical experience. First, we examine the relevant cognitive mechanisms using a twofold perspective: Can the respective mechanism be an impediment or can it be an enabler within the scenario process? We specify the circumstances under which the respective mechanism occurs and establish its assumed effects. Second, we outline recommendations on how to modify the method to reduce the bias or to take advantage of it, respectively. In summary, we propose that the contextual debiasing effect of scenario processes can be significantly advanced by applying these modifications and a facilitation team that is aware of psychological biases and heuristics. Finally, implications for the scenario method and directions for future research are discussed.

According to the metaphorical framing model, the use of metaphors in discussing an issue influences recipients’ understanding and assessment of that issue. In a recent study, participants read a text referring to a city’s crime problem either as a beast or a virus and then proposed counter-measures for that problem. Participants’ suggestions differed depending on the metaphor they had read. This replication matched the original procedure regarding the content of the rhetorical figures (beast vs virus), the topic under focus (crime) and the measurement of the dependent variable (open-end format to collect participants’ proposals). The procedure differed from the original with respect to language (German instead of English) and by including the formal type of rhetorical figure (metaphor or simile) as a factor. A systematic influence of the content of the figure on subjects’ proposals was observed. Presenting the rhetorical figure as a metaphor or a simile had no effect. Taken together, we were able to replicate the main effect of the original study. Metaphors do indeed frame reasoning.

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