Although public–private partnerships (PPPs) are frequently analyzed and lauded in terms of efficiency, their impact on public values is often neglected. As a result, there is little empirical evidence supporting or rejecting the claim that PPPs have a negative effect on public values. This case study provides valuable insight into the relationship between public values in PPPs and the circumstances affecting the degree to which public values are upheld. Research findings demonstrate that whether public values are at stake in PPPs cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Rather, public values can be threatened, safeguarded, or even strengthened depending on the project phase and the specific facet of the public value under scrutiny. Insight into which circumstances influence the safeguarding of public values in DBFMO (design–build–finance–maintain–operate) projects unravels the strengths and weaknesses of PPPs in terms of public values, providing public managers with a starting point for optimization.

Scholars' criticism of transparency in public–private partnerships (PPPs) often focuses on ‘external’ transparency, that is, the extent to which internal information is visible to the outside world. However, to achieve external transparency, internal transparency – the availability and inferability of information for the public procurer and the private party – is crucial. In this article we analyse input, process, and output transparency from three different perspectives (institutional, cognitive, and strategic) in four PPPs in the Netherlands. We conclude that input transparency is high, but process and output transparency less so. Moreover, output transparency has gained importance in PPPs. Whether this is problematic depends on the PPPs' institutional environment. In some partnerships the desired output is uncontested and predetermined by clear standards in the institutional environment, whereas other PPPs deal with contested output norms, decreasing the partnerships' transparency. These results nuance the current debate on the lack of transparency in PPPs.

Although public-private partnerships (PPPs) are often evaluated in terms of efficiency, their impact on public values is often neglected. In order to find out what we know about the public values-PPPs relation, this article reviews public administration literature and describes two opposite perspectives. The first perspective argues that public values are at stake whereas the second argues they are safeguarded or even reinforced. We argue that the assumptions of both perspectives are biased and incomparable due to the fact that each perspective holds a different ontological understanding of the concept of public values. Finally, we provide some ideas for further research.

Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO) contracts are a particular type of public-private partnership whereby governments transfer the responsibility for the design, construction, financing, maintenance, and operation of a public infrastructure or utility service building to a multi-headed private consortium through a long-term performance contract. These arrangements present a typical principal-agent problem because they incorporate a "carrot and stick" approach in which the agent (consortium) has to fulfill the expectations of the principal (procurer). This article deals with a neglected aspect in the literature related to the actual use of "the sticks or sanctions" in DBFMOs and assesses to what extent and under which conditions contract managers adopt a deterrence-based enforcement approach or switch to a persuasion-based approach, specifically when the contract clauses require the use of (automatic) deterrence. An empirical analysis of four DBFMOs in the Netherlands shows that the continuation of service delivery, the need to build trust, and the lack of agreement on output specifications play a role in the willingness of the procurer to apply a more responsive behavior that uses persuasion, even when deterrence should be automatically applied.

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