Background In 2021, donor countries, the pharmaceutical industry, and the COVAX initiative promoted vaccine donation or “dose-sharing” as a main solution to the inequitable global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX positioned itself as a global vaccine-sharing hub that promised to share doses “equitably, effectively and transparently,” according to rational criteria overseen by independent scientists. This article provides a critical analysis of the principles and practice of “dose-sharing,” showing how it reveals the politics at play within COVAX. Results Donated doses were an important source of COVAX’s vaccine supply in 2021, accounting for 60% of the doses the initiative delivered (543 million out of 910 million). However, donations could not compensate fully for COVAX’s persistent procurement struggles: it delivered less than half of the two billion doses it originally projected for 2021, a fraction of the 9.25 billion doses that were administered globally in 2021. Donor countries and vaccine manufacturers systematically broke COVAX’s principles for maximizing the impact of dose-sharing, delivering doses late, in smaller quantities than promised, and in ad hoc ways that made roll-out in recipient countries difficult. Some donors even earmarked doses for specific recipients, complicating and potentially undermining COVAX’s equitable allocation mechanism. Conclusions COVAX’s pivot from global vaccine procurement mechanism to dose-sharing hub can be seen as a “win-win-win” solution for COVAX itself (who could claim success by having access to more doses), for donor countries (who could rebrand themselves as charitable donors rather than “vaccine hoarders”), and for the pharmaceutical industry (maintaining the status quo on intellectual property rights and protecting their commercial interests). Although dose-sharing helped COVAX’s vaccine delivery, its impact was undermined by donors’ and industry’s pursuit of national security, diplomatic and commercial interests, which COVAX largely accommodated. The lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms within COVAX’s overly complex governance structure as a global public-private partnership enabled these practices.

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The growth of global public-private partnerships for health has opened up new spaces for civil society participation in global health governance. Such participation is often justified by the claim that civil society organizations, because of their independence and links to communities, can help address democratic deficits in global-level decision-making processes. This article examines the notion of ‘civil society engagement’ within major public–private partnerships for health, where civil society is often said to play a particularly important role in mediating between public and private spheres. How do major global health partnerships actually define ‘civil society’, who represents civil society within their global-level decision-making bodies, and what formal power do civil society representatives hold relative to other public and private-sector partners? Based on a structured analysis of publicly available documents of 18 of the largest global public–private partnerships for health, we show that many of them make laudatory claims about the value of their ‘civil society engagement’. Most use the term ‘civil society’ to refer to non-governmental organizations and communities affected by particular health issues, and state that they expect these actors to represent the needs and interests of specific populations in global-level decisions about strategies, funding models and policies. Yet, such civil society actors have a relatively low level of representation within the partnerships’ boards and steering committees, especially compared with private-sector actors (10.3 vs 23.7%). Moreover, there is little evidence of civil society representatives’ direct and substantial influence within the partnerships’ global-level governing bodies, where many decisions affecting country-level programmes are made. Rather, their main role within these partnerships seems to be to implement projects and advocate and raise funds, despite common discourses that emphasise civil society's watchdog function and transformative power. The findings suggest the need for in-depth research into the formal and informal power of civil society within global health governance processes.

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