Cyberbullying has proven consequential to youth Internet users and previous methods relied heavily on the use of manually developed dictionaries. This project describes preliminary results for a system that uses Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) for the detection of cyberbullying in a labeled collection of posts from Formspring.me. After preprocessing to account for variations in spelling and use of emoticons, a search system was developed. Our system significantly outperforms the baseline with a very simple query and is not dependent on a dictionary of bullying terms. CCS Concepts •Information systems → Web and social media search; Data stream mining; •Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;

The effect of the type and amount of catalyst and the regime of heating on the determination of nitrogen in coal by a semi‐micro method, based essentially on that of Kjeldahl, has been investigated. Results obtained by the use of mercuric sulphate/selenium and vanadium pentoxide/selenium catalysts have been compared with those obtained by the standard macro‐method. A modified Markham distillation apparatus is described, and it is shown that by its use ‘blank’ corrections are considerably reduced. Estimates have also been made of the limits within which duplicate results should agree for both semi‐micro and macro‐methods and of the limits of error of the determination.

Since 2016, Russia has engaged in a dedicated influence operation against the United States to exacerbate existing cleavages in American society and to undermine US national security. Although distinctly modern in its use of social media platforms, the current methods align with old Soviet doctrine using information warfare to gain a strategic edge over competitors. We examine Russia’s use of military-related content and profiles in their influence operation on Twitter and, in particular, the strategic deployment of military narratives. Using data from Twitter’s comprehensive data archive of state-backed information operations, we find that 12.14% of the 1,408,712 tweets in English from 2009 through February 2021 contain military-related content. In addition, of the 2,370 fake accounts on Twitter tied to the IRA and GRU, 148 were from accounts posing as military or military-adjacent, and these accounts posted 12.7% of the influence operation’s tweets. Together, tweets containing military-related content or coming from fake military and military-adjacent profiles account for 22.6% of the tweets identified as part of the Russian influence operation on Twitter. The Russians used narratives related to veterans, particularly sacrifice narratives and post-Vietnam government betrayal of sacrifice narratives. Patriotic sacrifice narratives were used to gather and engage an audience and to legitimize and amplify the content and accounts. In contrast, betrayal of sacrifice narratives were weaponized to amplify and escalate divisive social issues by tying them to veterans’ sacrifices. We conclude the Russians amplified existing military narratives in American culture and used fake American military profiles to wrap anti-government sentiment in patriotic trappings to exacerbate existing social divisions. Turning Americans against their government achieves Russian strategic goals of removing American influence abroad and allowing Russia to have greater impact on the levers of international power that serve Russian interests.

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