PurposeThe paper aims to examine the relation between fees paid to auditors and audit quality during the period of 2000‐2003.Design/methodology/approachThe paper constructs a measure of auditor profitability that is used as a proxy for auditor independence. The methodology is grounded in the notion that auditor independence is influenced by effort and risk‐adjusted fees, rather than the level of fees received from clients. Since, risk and effort are unobservable, the paper uses proxies based on client size, complexity and risk to estimate abnormal fees. Abnormal fees are derived using a fee estimation model drawn from prior literature. The paper employs two metrics to assess audit quality – the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash flows and the absolute value of performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals.FindingsThe paper documents a statistically significant negative association between total fees and both audit quality proxies over all years. These findings are robust to a variety of additional tests and several alternative design specifications. The results (pre‐ and post‐SOX) are consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather than auditor reputational concerns.Research limitations/implicationsThe possibility that the empirical tests do not completely capture the impact of unobserved risk cannot be ruled out, though the paper attempts to do so by employing alternative specifications and sensitivity tests.Practical implicationsPolicy makers should note that current restrictions on the provision of non‐audit services may not sufficiently resolve the issue of economic bonding and its impact on auditor independence.Originality/valueIn contrast to previous studies whose results are ambiguous, the paper finds a statistically significant positive association between several measures of total fees (it uses size‐adjusted and abnormal fees) and two metrics of accruals quality in all years (2000‐2003), consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather then auditor reputation concerns.

The use of blockchain technology has increased tremendously over the last decade. Blockchain continues to evolve and new features and capabilities are developed continuously. Although the use of the technology started in cryptocurrency (specifically, Bitcoin), it has expanded to other areas that can benefit from a shared, secure, ledger. This article investigates the potential impact of blockchain technology on the accounting profession. This article analyzes data security and privacy considerations, technology, adoption, and implementation considerations, and some considerations that relate specifically to accounting and auditing. We find that the unique needs of an accounting information system may not be a good match for blockchain as it currently exists. While we explain that blockchain may deliver many benefits, particularly in the areas of data reliability and the financial statement audit, we identify several factors, which raise significant questions about whether blockchain will ever be significantly integrated in the accounting function. Chief among those concerns is the scalability of the technology at an acceptable cost. While significant investment has and will be made for further development of blockchain business applications, it is our assessment that proponents of blockchain integration in accounting have not yet made the economic case for it. We also have significant concerns about whether blockchain technology can adequately address risks associated with data security and privacy. Addressing all these issues will be a minimum requirement for gaining widespread acceptance by firms and their accountants.

The issue of whether auditor fees affect auditor independence has been extensively debated by regulators, investors, investment professionals, auditors, and researchers. The revised Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements that resulted from the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (2002) limit nonaudit services (NAS) and mandate NAS fee disclosure. The SEC's requirements are based on the argument that auditor independence could be impaired—and hence audit quality may be reduced—when auditors become economically dependent on their clients or audit their own work. Economic bonding leads to reduced independence, which can lead to reduced audit quality. We study a sample of firms sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (SEC‐sanctioned fraud firms) and examine whether there is a relationship between auditor fee variables and the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud. We use SEC sanction as a measure of audit quality that has not previously been used in the auditor fee literature and is more precise than some of the other proxies used for flawed financial/auditor reporting. We find, in univariate tests, that fraud firms paid significantly higher (total, audit, and NAS) fees. However, in multivariate tests, when controlling for other fraud determinants and endogeneity among the fraud, NAS, and audit fee variables, we find that while NAS fees and total fees are positively and significantly related to the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud, audit fees are not. These findings suggest that higher NAS fees may cause economic bonding, thereby leading to reduced audit quality. Our findings of significantly higher NAS fees and total fees in fraud firms hold after controlling for latent size effects and other rigorous testing. These results contribute to the literature that examines the SEC's concerns regarding NAS and can be used by policy makers for additional consideration.

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