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Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject's patience, gender, altruism, and compliance with first-order stochastic dominance have some limited systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject's patience, gender, and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically equivalent first-price auction and silent Dutch formats in hinting that one should condition one's estimate of the value on having the highest bid. Both Bayesian updating skills and non-probabilistic reasoning skills are shown to help subjects correct for the winner's curse, as does the saliency of the active-clock Dutch format. (JEL D12, D44, D83)

We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to the Nash benchmark.We can separately consider whether a subject draws inferences from the other subject's investment, in hindsight, and whether a subject has the foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k belief predictions, behavior remains the same across our experimental treatments. Our maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories, but are consistent with the notion that subjects use simple rules of thumb, based on insights about the game.

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