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Blockchain technology claims to disrupt the existing financial system, the way of doing business, and to empower ordinary citizens against an elitist economy through decentralization of the decision-making process. In the political arena, the disruptive ideology branded as 'populism' challenges the neo-liberal establishment. By appealing to peoples' fears, frustrations, and dissatisfaction with the political elites, exploiting distrust in the so-called establishment, populism claims to deliver more power to the people. In this article, we draw a parallel between core foundations of political populism and those of blockchain and propose a theory of technological populism. Technological populism as reflected by blockchain platforms exploits the rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised through decentralized decision-making process, enabling anonymity of transactions, dehumanizing trust (promoting trust in computation rather than trust in humans and institutions) as well as breaking the monopoly in the financial system and money supply. The rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised against financial elites is not only propaganda but also a method of accumulating wealth for technocratic elites. Ultimately, the blockchain and cryptocurrency world has perfected what political populists have pioneered-unrealistic promises, turning the citizen against "the elites" only so long as they are not the elites in charge.

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One of the defining features of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 is the secured creditor's ability to take possession of the collateral upon the debtor's default "without breach of peace." This standard is meant to protect the debtor from abusive secured creditors, the meaning of which has been shaped by courts on a case-by-case basis. In reforming their secured transactions laws to enhance access to credit, continental legal systems have shown great reception to Article 9 by adopting the unitary concept and functional approach to security interests, introducing private enforcement mechanisms, including various forms of self-help repossession. However, the "without breach of peace" standard seems to be rejected by most national laws and international legal instruments acceded to by civil law countries, to accommodate the supposedly alien idea of self-help repossession with civil law tradition. Based on comparative analysis of secured transactions laws of the US, the UK, Romania, and Hungary (representing national laws), and the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 2017] CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9 101 along with the Aircraft Protocol and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (representing international legal instruments), this article demonstrates that continental European legal systems are generally apprehensive with the "without breach of peace" standard. Thus, they are reluctant to transplant it to their legislation and try to either modify it or replace it with different legal requirements. This article concludes that the alternatives of the "without breach of peace" standard prevailing in continental legal systems undermine the privilege of the secured creditor, pose enforcement problems (such as uncertainty of creditors' rights and possible abuses against consumer-debtors), and restrain out-of-court enforcement.

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