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and Legal Process and the Legal Theory Workshop at Yale Law School provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 1. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 592 (1984) defines legal consciousness as ".. . all the ideas about the nature, function and operation of law held by anyone in society at a given time." I use the term consciousness, but I could have as easily substituted ideology. Indeed for my purposes legal consciousness and legal ideology could be used interchangeably. Consciousness and ideology are used instead of attitudes because speaking about attitudes toward or about law suggests a radical individuation, a picture of persons influenced by a variety of factors, thinking, choosing, deciding autonomously how and what to think. The language of attitudes links popular views of law with feelings and, in so doing, "diminishes the authority of the attitude holder."

No abstract

In the research from which this paper is derived, we have observed and tape-recorded approximately 115 lawyer-client conferences. Our observations were made in two sites, one in California and one in Massachusetts. In this paper we take an in-depth look at the nature of lawyer-client discourse by focusing on one conference. We explore three of the most important themes in that discourse. First is the discussion and characterization of the legal system and its major actors. Next is the exploration of the advantages and disadvantages of disposing of disputed issues through negotiation or trial. Finally, the third theme involves the “legal construction of the client,” where a lawyer and client discuss rules of relevance that govern the legal process as well as the aspects of the client's experience that are to be the subject of legal inquiry. The paper concludes by exploring the way each of these themes expresses or embodies prevailing legal ideologies and influences the way cases develop and are managed.