The study of policy lies at the intersection of economics and ethics, dealing, to a great extent, with private property. Policy design therefore assumes an understanding of the relationship between property and human nature, a matter of great interest to John Locke. Locke's teaching, however, is far from clear, often composed of a set of dual arguments. Yet close attention to the dualistic arguments is revealing: the two objects Locke associates with property—life and convenience—correspond to the two bases upon which he grounds the right to property: labor and consent. His argument reflects the changing economic nature of property, and also provides insight into the poles within which people behave according to the Law of Nature. Thus, a full explication of the relationship between Locke's Law of Nature and doctrine of property illuminates the economic and ethical principles that ought to inform policymakers and analysts.

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This article considers the relationship between policy design and the pattern of interests attracted to the political arena. It examines legislation crafted by a large coalition of diverse interests that designed policy favorable to problem solving. This is the kind of policymaking that regime theorists identify with social productionbut also one considered a rare circumstance. Previous attempts at passing similar legislation failed because the problem was defined narrowly and the political arena contained only two stakeholders, offering no opportunity to introduce a change that benefited one without harming the other. Success required redefining the problem and changing the nature of the political arena in a manner similar to that described by Schattschneider. By doing so, diverse interests discovered a way to benefit collectively. The present case therefore demonstrates the advantage of coupling the strategic insight of Schattschneider with the normative goals of regime theorists. Polity (2007) 39, 137-154.

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