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The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to amend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 100 – 185, 2004 Edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100 – 185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

Safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed, certified packages ensures protection of the public and environment using rigorous system packaging requirements. This protocol was conducted to determine the effects of drop testing on a Type B shipping package (DPP-3) performance per normal and hypothetical accident conditions tests. Preparation, testing, and post-test evaluations of a Type B shipping package tested to 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.71 and 71.73 requirements are presented. Six packages were subjected to free drop, puncture, and thermal tests per 10 CFR 71.73. The posttest helium leak test showed a leak rate < 1 × 10−7 He-cc/sec, indicating that the containment boundary and leak-tight environment were maintained. Statistical analyses were performed to determine changes in package performance. The null hypothesis was that measurements would not change enough from pre- to post-testing to show statistical significance, which would indicate too much variability in package design. A repeated measures t-test was used to analyze drum lid and containment vessel (CV) torques. All six CV lid torques were statistically significant, but only three drum lid torques were statistically significant. Therefore, lid design caused more variability than necessary when subjected to the horizontal-and-cold, vertical-lid-down, and corner-with-lid-up drop tests. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) analyzed package heights and diameters, with results on height indicating four of the six certification test units (CTUs) were statistically significant. Thus, CTU design caused more variability than necessary when subjected to horizontal-hot, horizontal-cold, corner-lid-up, and corner-lid-down tests. One-way ANOVA analysis of diameter indicated that all six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, CTU design caused more variability than necessary when subjected to all tests. The DPP-3 has been shown to be an acceptable design for transport of radioactive materials, but statistical analysis revealed that package and test design can be improved to reduce variability in performance before and after testing.

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