The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to amend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 100 – 185, 2004 Edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100 – 185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

In general, the design process involves envisioning and developing concepts for a component or system, combining these fractions into an integrated whole and evaluating the final design against functional requirements. A major challenge is developing components or systems to a level of maturity that permits feasibility evaluation of the integrated whole while optimizing opposing performance functions (e.g., thick for strength, but thin for heat transfer). Economic pressure often drives design concepts to conservative bases early in the process. The approach presented in this paper is a highly costeffective means of developing alternative design solutions for given set of design requirements -in this case a radioactive materials (RAM) transportation package.

The 9979 Type AF Shipping Package is a cost-effective radioactive material packaging designed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) that consists of two primary components: a foamed outer drum for structural protection and an inner containment drum. The packaging was designed to transport Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), and other isotopes not exceeding a Type A quantity. These contents have the potential to generate flammable hydrogen gas during transport due to the degradation of hydrogenous materials (e.g. water vapor, plastics, etc) by high-energy alpha radiation. Since 10 CFR 71.43(h) prohibits the incorporation of packaging features explicitly designed for continuous venting, alternative justification was required to demonstrate that the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43(d) for negligible reactions between packaging components and contents were satisfied. An analysis was performed to demonstrate that the potential for hydrogen gas generation over a one-year period was limited by the effects of permeation through the packaging materials. The rate of hydrogen collection was evaluated for both the inner containment drum and the outer structural drum under 10 CFR 71.71 Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT). The analysis concludes that the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) for hydrogen gas will not be reached in a one-year shipping period assuming a minimum void volume is maintained within the drum.

The 9979 Type AF Shipping Packaging is a cost-effective radioactive material package designed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) that consists of two primary components: a foamed outer drum for structural protection and an inner containment drum. The packaging was designed to transport Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), and other isotopes not exceeding a Type A quantity. These contents have the potential to generate flammable hydrogen gas during transport due to the degradation of hydrogenous materials (e.g. water vapor, plastics, etc) by high-energy alpha radiation. Since 10 CFR 71.43(h) prohibits the incorporation of packaging features explicitly designed for continuous venting, alternative justification was required to demonstrate that the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43(d) for negligible reactions between packaging components and contents were satisfied. An analysis was performed to demonstrate that the potential for hydrogen gas generation over a one-year period was limited by the effects of permeation through the packaging materials. The rate of hydrogen collection was evaluated for both the inner containment drum and the outer structural drum under 10 CFR 71.71 Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT). The analysis concludes that the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) for hydrogen gas will not be reached in a one-year shipping period assuming a minimum void volume is maintained within the drum.

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