In general, the design process involves envisioning and developing concepts for a component or system, combining these fractions into an integrated whole and evaluating the final design against functional requirements. A major challenge is developing components or systems to a level of maturity that permits feasibility evaluation of the integrated whole while optimizing opposing performance functions (e.g., thick for strength, but thin for heat transfer). Economic pressure often drives design concepts to conservative bases early in the process. The approach presented in this paper is a highly costeffective means of developing alternative design solutions for given set of design requirements -in this case a radioactive materials (RAM) transportation package.

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This paper offers a practical means of qualifying previously loaded Type B packages for transportation onsite within the DOE complex after years of protected storage, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses relevant packaging components and introduces part of a surveillance program carried out at the Savannah River Site supporting long-term storage of 3013-processed plutonium-bearing materials within closed 9975 packages and its application to DOE's Equivalent Safety. Under normal service, maintenance is carried out annually to re-qualify the 9975 packagings for leak-tight transportation service. While in storage, however, annual maintenance was judged not to provide a significant increase in safety but to increase storage operation costs and to violate ALARA principles. Hence, a surveillance program was developed to investigate and confirm predictions of storage-related behavior of 9975 packaging materials, including the performance of O-ring seals and Celotex ® insulation. The combination of analytical evaluations with surveillance data is shown sufficient to ensure that the 9975 packages can accommodate 1) time at storage temperature and 2) cumulative radiation dose without compromising subsequent performance under regulatory Normal Conditions of Transport or site-specific credible accident conditions.

This paper proposes an alternative approach to qualifying gas generating radioactive payloads for shipment within Type B packaging through application of hydrogen recombiner/getter technology. This work compliments an earlier paper by the first author describing a direct measurement approach to achieving the same qualification goal. Specifically, this paper discusses another part of the success at the Savannah River Site in authorizing onsite transfer of legacy Radioactive Materials within the DDF-1 package. The current safety basis requires a measurement of storage can pressure and placement of a recombiner/getter product inside the package containment vessel to prevent significant hydrogen accumulation within the closed volume surrounding the storage can. These two actions are sufficient to ensure 1) that deflagration pressure of a potential flammable gas mixture is within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave are within the Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

Characterization data describing radioactive materials (RAM) in storage are likely those associated with the processes that produced the materials or with the mission for which they were produced. Along with impurity data, often absent or unknown as a result of post-processing storage environment is moisture content. Radiolysis of moisture may lead to a hydrogen flammability hazard within a closed volume such as a storage can or a transportation package. This paper offers a practical means of qualifying payloads of unknown moisture content for shipment within Type B packaging, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses part of a qualification program carried out at the Savannah River Site for onsite shipment of legacy RAM within the DDF-1 package. The DDF-1 is an onsite-only prototype of the currently certified 9975 package. Measurement of storage-can lid bulge can provide an upper bound for pressure within a storage can. Subsequent belljar testing can measure the rate of gas leakage from a storage can. These actions are shown sufficient to ensure that the performance of the 9975 containment vessels can accommodate 1) the deflagration energy from flammable gas mixtures within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave within Hypothetical Accident Conditions.