In this paper, we provide two extensions of the constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. We present some characterisations and relations with corresponding games. The two new extensions are illustrated by a specific application.

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations. Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence.

No abstract

Value, Lower value, Matrix games, Strategic games, Coalitional games,

Johnston (1978), Deegan andPackel (1979), andHoller (1982) proposed three power indices for simple games: Johnston index, Deegan-Packel index, and the Public Good Index. In this paper, methods to compute these indices by means of the multilinear extension of the game are presented. Furthermore, a new characterization of the Public Good Index is given. Our methods are applied to two real-world examples taken from the political field.