This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.

In today's increasingly interconnected world, co‐opetition has emerged as a new business practice among many high‐tech firms. The boundaries between cooperation and competition becomes vague, and rivals engage in collaborative activities. This study develops an analytical model to investigate the dual sourcing decision of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the presence of a competitive supplier (i.e., frenemy) as well as a non‐competitive supplier who nevertheless suffers from unreliable production yield. We study the competitive supplier's dual channel decision if it prefers operating both component‐selling business and self‐branded business, and find that the OEM always prefers supplier diversification even though the additional non‐competitive supplier is unreliable. Interestingly, our results reveal that the non‐competitive supplier's expected profit is unimodal in its production technology level, which suggests the non‐competitive supplier may not have incentive to improve its production technology once it reaches a threshold. Furthermore, we analyze the credibility of the competitive supplier's threat to terminate the supply of the components to OEM as a response of OEM's engagement of a new supplier. We show that this termination of component‐selling business by competitive supplier is a non‐credible threat to prevent OEM from seeking the alternative supplier.

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We study three basic price competition games engaged in by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and its competitive original design manufacturer (ODM): a simultaneous pricing game, an OEM-pricing-early game, and an ODM-pricing-early game. The ODM provides contract manufacturing service to the OEM and competes with this OEM in the consumer market by selling self-branded products. We consider two market environments: the ODM market and the OEM market. For the ODM market, we show that a sequential pricing game arises as the outcome preferred by the OEM and its ODM. Moreover, the equilibrium that the OEM prices early risk-dominates the one that the ODM prices early. Nevertheless, for the OEM market, the simultaneous pricing game and the sequential pricing game can both arise and be sustained. We also demonstrate that it is in their mutual interest to be friends rather than foes.

M otivated by observations in the greater China region, this paper studies a multinational firm (MNF)'s preferences between two procurement strategies in a global business environment. The MNF relies on a contract manufacturer (CM) to produce its products, which serve both markets within (domestic market) and outside (overseas market) China. The MNF is assumed to be monopolistic in the overseas market but faces competition from a local original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who outsources both manufacturing and component procurement to the CM. The MNF will decide whether to control its component procurement (consignment strategy) or delegate that function to the CM (turnkey strategy). Our study indicates that a number of factors unique to the global supply chain environment, such as a multi-market structure with different sizes and natures of competition, and a set of tax rules that gives differential treatment to products serving different markets, have the potential of impacting the MNF's choice of consignment vs. turnkey strategies, sometimes in interesting ways. In particular, we find that when attempting to balance the pros and cons of cooperating with the local OEM under turnkey while competing against it in the domestic market, the MNF's preference could switch twice from turnkey to consignment and back to turnkey, and its global profits could first decrease and then increase, as the domestic market grows. Our study also highlights the importance of making a company's global supply chain management decisions while considering international tax rules.