M otivated by observations in the greater China region, this paper studies a multinational firm (MNF)'s preferences between two procurement strategies in a global business environment. The MNF relies on a contract manufacturer (CM) to produce its products, which serve both markets within (domestic market) and outside (overseas market) China. The MNF is assumed to be monopolistic in the overseas market but faces competition from a local original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who outsources both manufacturing and component procurement to the CM. The MNF will decide whether to control its component procurement (consignment strategy) or delegate that function to the CM (turnkey strategy). Our study indicates that a number of factors unique to the global supply chain environment, such as a multi-market structure with different sizes and natures of competition, and a set of tax rules that gives differential treatment to products serving different markets, have the potential of impacting the MNF's choice of consignment vs. turnkey strategies, sometimes in interesting ways. In particular, we find that when attempting to balance the pros and cons of cooperating with the local OEM under turnkey while competing against it in the domestic market, the MNF's preference could switch twice from turnkey to consignment and back to turnkey, and its global profits could first decrease and then increase, as the domestic market grows. Our study also highlights the importance of making a company's global supply chain management decisions while considering international tax rules.

W e consider an integrated multinational firm (MNF) who produces a product in a low-tax country and sells it in a high-tax country. The global firm faces the decision of whether to sell the product (and at what price) to an external rival in the retail market who has an alternative outside sourcing option. Using a Cournot competition model, we show that two salient elements of the global tax planning-namely the tax rate disparity and the regulatory restrictions on transfer pricing between the MNF's low-tax and high-tax divisions-have significant impacts on the MNF's decision of selling to the rival. We find that when the tax rate disparity is low, the MNF will sell, but only to a low-cost rival, a result that is in-line with the traditional understanding in a tax-free setting. However, when the tax rate disparity is high, the outcome of selling or not reverses: the MNF will sell only to a high-cost rival. We also find that under the requirement of minimum order quantity, the MNF may sell to the rival at a price even higher than the latter's alternative sourcing cost. Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the regulatory restriction on transfer pricing may bring benefit rather than burden to the global firm.

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