Abstract:We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption and the exploitation of natural resources. The first is conceptual. Studies that use national level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many fofms, at multiple levels, that may affect resource use quite differently: negatively, positively or not at all. Without a clear causal model of the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources. The second problem is methodological. Simple, atheoretical models linking corruption measures and natural resource use typically 4o not account for other important control variables pivotal to the relationship between huijaans and natural resources. By way of illustration of these two general concerns, we demonstrate that the findings of a recent, well-known study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests and elephants are not robust to simple conceptuaf and methodological refinements.

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Abstract:We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption and the exploitation of natural resources. The first is conceptual. Studies that use national level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many fofms, at multiple levels, that may affect resource use quite differently: negatively, positively or not at all. Without a clear causal model of the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources. The second problem is methodological. Simple, atheoretical models linking corruption measures and natural resource use typically 4o not account for other important control variables pivotal to the relationship between huijaans and natural resources. By way of illustration of these two general concerns, we demonstrate that the findings of a recent, well-known study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests and elephants are not robust to simple conceptuaf and methodological refinements.

Ghana's 2008 presidential election caught the world's attention. In a close presidential run-off, the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) defeated the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) by less than one-half of a percentage point after the NPP came in first place in the first round by just over 1 percent. 1 International and domestic observers praised the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) for its professionalism in counting the ballots in a very close set of races and the parties for their adherence to democratic procedures during the campaign. In his speech to the Ghanaian parliament in July 2009, U.S. President Obama remarked that "[t]he people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections." 2 Despite the recognition due to the EC and parties for a well-managed election, analysts have focused less attention on why voters chose the party they did. In particular, few have examined to what extent ethnicity versus attributes and evaluations of the parties determined for whom Ghanaians cast their vote. This is surprising given the intense campaigns the NDC and NPP ran, the number of declared undecided voters in preelection polls, and that the NDC's candidate did not hail from an ethnic group typically associated with that party.We inquire whether ethnicity or party attributes and perceptions can better explain voting patterns in Ghana's 2008 election. Did Ghanaians have firm opinions of parties? Did NDC and NPP voters form distinct ethnic blocks, or did each party attract votes from a diverse range of ethnic groups? These questions are important because they examine a core debate about elections in sub-Saharan Africa: are elections ethnic headcounts, or do beliefs about parties shape vote choice in far more complex ways than ethnic group membership?To answer these questions, we derive predictions from a new theoretical approach to voting behavior in Africa. We also utilize a robust and novel research design-a nationally representative exit poll conducted of voters on Election Day-to test these hypotheses. The results from our exit poll are clear. While ethnicity was relevant for some voters, evaluations and perceptions of the parties were far more important determinants of vote choice. Although supporters of the NPP and NDC were ethnically heterogeneous 127

Scholars blame high levels of ethnic heterogeneity for many social and political ills, including poor economic growth, corruption, and policy gridlock. But it can be argued that, in seeking reelection, politicians will join multiethnic coalitions to pass policies in this endeavor. Further, government expenditure increases with coalition size, as each politician seeks policies that benefit his or her own constituents. Subnational data from Zambia, the use of which helps control for country-level factors hindering standard cross-national studies of fiscal politics, indicate that government spending increases with ethnic heterogeneity. This evidence challenges studies which ignore the incentives generated by political institutions and claim that ethnicity leads directly to undesirable outcomes.