In May 1995, an international team characterized and contained an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Active surveillance was instituted using several methods, including house-to-house search, review of hospital and dispensary logs, interview of health care personnel, retrospective contact tracing, and direct follow-up of suspect cases. In the field, a clinical case was defined as fever and hemorrhagic signs, fever plus contact with a case-patient, or fever plus at least 3 of 10 symptoms. A total of 315 cases of EHF, with an 81% case fatality, were identified, excluding 10 clinical cases with negative laboratory results. The earliest documented case-patient had onset on 6 January, and the last case-patient died on 16 July. Eighty cases (25%) occurred among health care workers. Two individuals may have been the source of infection for >50 cases. The outbreak was terminated by the initiation of barrier-nursing techniques, health education efforts, and rapid identification of cases.

On 6 May 1995, the Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) coordinator in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), received a request for assistance for what was believed to be a concurrent outbreak of bacillary dysentery and viral hemorrhagic fever (suspected Ebola hemorrhagic fever [EHF]) in the town of Kikwit, DRC. On 11 May, the MSF intervention team assessed Kikwit General Hospital. This initial assessment revealed a nonfunctional isolation ward for suspected EHF cases; a lack of water and electricity; no waste disposal system; and no protective gear for medical staff. The priorities set by MSF were to establish a functional isolation ward to deal with EHF and to distribute protective supplies to individuals who were involved with patient care. Before the intervention, 67 health workers contracted EHF; after the initiation of control measures, just 3 cases were reported among health staff and none among Red Cross volunteers involved in body burial.

Influenza virus infections are a major public health threat. Vaccination is available, but unpredictable antigenic changes in circulating strains require annual modification of seasonal influenza vaccines. Vaccine effectiveness has proven limited, particularly in certain groups, such as the elderly. Moreover, preparedness for upcoming pandemics is challenging because we can predict neither the strain that will cause the next pandemic nor the severity of the pandemic. The European Union fosters research and innovation to develop novel vaccines that evoke broadly protective and long-lasting immune responses against both seasonal and pandemic influenza, underpinned by a political commitment to global public health.

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