Phenomenology, as a distinct philosophy in the modern sense, began with the publication of Logical Investigations (1900/1970) by Edmund Husserl. Husserl's thought developed continuously, if nonlinearly, over roughly a half century in which he was active as a scholar and thinker. He influenced many of the dominant philosophers of the 20th century who worked in the continental tradition (e.g., Heidegger, 1927Heidegger, /1962 Merleau-Ponty, 1945 Sartre, 1943Sartre, / 1956) and often the thought of those Husserl influenced became more wellknown than the thought of Husserl himself, often unfairly so (MacDonald, 2001), especially in the social and human sciences. Speigelberg (1982) has written the classic history of this movement, and the reader is referred to his work for more details concerning philosophical phenomenology and its history.There was also a grassroots American phenomenological movement in psychology that initiated with the work of Snygg (1935) in the 1930s, especially Snygg and Combs (1949) later. However, this development took place without any influence of continental philosophical phenomenology. In essence, phenomenology means for this tradition "from the point of view of the behaving organism itself" (Snygg, 1941, p. 406). The major contribution of this grassroots phenomenological tradition were pulled together and published by Kuenzli (1959). This book contains 14 chapters by the major representatives of this approach, including Snygg, Combs, Rogers, and MacLeod. A check of all the references indicates that no major philosopher of the continental philosophical tradition is referenced in any of the 14 chapters. Only in the selected bibliography section at the end of the book are two of Sartre's smaller works mentioned. Moreover, the idea of a phenomenological method as applied in psychology is not articulated in any of the chapters. Mostly the argument was presented as a need for a phenomenological "approach," "perspective," or "frame of reference." This tradition obviously has interesting aspects but it does not touch on the method to be articulated in this chapter. Neither does the defense of phenomenology by Rogers and MacLeod in the famous debate with behaviorism touch on the manner in which the phenomenological method should be used in psychology (Wann, 1964).

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The purpose of this study was to explore how one person experienced the early years of dementia as she was living through the pre-clinical and early clinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Interviews were held on four occasions over a period of three years. The data were analyzed using the descriptive phenomenological psychological method, in which the researcher approached the data from a caring perspective. The lived experience of early-stage Alzheimer’s disease showed to be a complex transitional phenomenon that involves a dynamic process of personal adjustment. The process is set in motion as the participant receives the diagnosis and will eventually lead her towards a state of increased openness and receptiveness toward the disease. The results describe this process as it unfolds in the context of the overall experience, and the various adjustments that the participant undertakes. Some reflections concerning the plausible needs of patients with early-stage Alzheimer’s disease are included in the discussion.

This study was concerned with the clarification of the experience of pivotal moments in therapy. By pivotal moment is understood an event within the therapeutic process that leads to enduring change experienced as an important improvement in the life-experience of the client. Retrospective descriptions of a therapeutic process were obtained from three clients in which a distinguishable chain of events could be discerned that the clients identified as a pivotal moment. The descriptive material was analyzed according to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method developed by Amedeo Giorgi on the basis of the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The results show that the pivotal moment is experienced as a figural moment within the therapeutic process where a serious challenge to old assumptions takes place, necessitating a break from old cognitive, affective and behavioral patterns in a context of trust and safety within the therapeutic relationship.

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