"This paper draws on the theory of product differentiation in a trade context and uses three case studies to highlight the conditions necessary for a successful geographical-origin branding strategy for farm produce in the United States. In so doing, the U.S. country-of-origin labeling (COOL) scheme as a branding strategy for produce is assessed. The paper argues that the use of geographic identifiers to achieve product differentiation is viable, but any claim that such differentiation will prove useful at the country level for farm produce seems likely to be misplaced. In order to raise prices, a key complement to branding is some restriction on the volume of product going out under the brand name. These restrictions may be accomplished by supply controls, quality controls, or entry barriers, but will not be available to all U.S. products currently hoping to gain from mandatory COOL." Copyright 2006 Canadian Agricultural Economics Society.

Mandatory country-of-origin labelling (COOL), Seafood, Retail demand, Nielsen Homescan panel,

This article investigates the trade impact of Japan's decision in 2005 to revise its phytosanitary protocol for fire blight for U.S. apple imports but retain its codling moth protocol. The analysis presents a participation model to measure the economic costs of phytosanitary barriers to trade. The model provides an explicit cost of the phytosanitary barriers in terms of the structure of the protocols, an important advantage over the price-wedge methodology. This makes it possible to separate the economic costs of various protocols-in this case, the fire blight and codling moth protocols.

No abstract

Even if governments agree on equivalency of organic standards across countries, consumers may still believe domestically produced organic foods are superior to imports. We simulated a partial equilibrium model of trade in organic wheat between the United States and Germany to illustrate the welfare gains and losses associated with international harmonization of organic standards. Six cases were examined-no equivalency in standards (the status quo), equivalency of standards with complete and incomplete import acceptance, exporters certifying in importing country with complete and incomplete import acceptance, and exporters paying educational costs, with incomplete import acceptance. Results demonstrate that importing country consumers are better off if they are willing to accept imports as equivalent to domestically produced organic foods. Strategies to reduce resistance such as educational programs or foreign certification add costs to production that reduce quantity traded and impose welfare losses on exporting country producers and importing country consumers.