English law is settled in its view that Sports Governing Bodies ("SGBs") are not amenable to judicial review, following the Court of Appeal decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan. However, this article argues that, 27 years on from the leading decision, the issue merits reconsideration owing to flaws in judicial reasoning and, in particular, the subsequent growth of the government's involvement in sport. Moreover, the availability of judicial review in other jurisdictions and against other self-regulatory organisations suggests that the position of SGBs in English law is anomalous. Since Aga Khan, the courts have developed a private law "supervisory jurisdiction" which somewhat accounts for the absence of judicial review but, building on the work of Michael Beloff QC (among others), this article considers the substantive and procedural limitations of private law in challenging SGBs, finding that judicial review may be a preferable forum for sporting litigants. The paper also provides the opportunity to reflect upon the nature of the public-private divide in English law today.

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Professional sport has undoubtedly been hit hard by COVID-19. Clubs and governing bodies have had to adapt rapidly to the public health emergency and have come under great financial and regulatory strain. Some sports have weathered the storm better than others, though, and professional rugby union experienced significant off-field turbulence, with wages reductions seen across the English Premiership. This article will examine the conduct of Premiership Rugby and its clubs during theCOVID-19 crisis from a competition law perspective and will argue that, by acting in concert, Premiership and the clubs may have breached UK competition law.