While robust evidence is one ingredient in the policymaking process, it is by no means the only one. Engaging with policymakers and the policymaking process requires collaborative working models, navigating through the experiences, values and perspectives of policymakers and other stakeholders, as well as communicating evidence in an accessible manner. As a response to these requirements, over recent years there has been proliferation of activities that engage producers of evidence (specifically, academics), policymakers, practitioners, and the public in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. In this article, we describe one engagement approach for facilitating research evidence uptake into policy and practice-an activity called a 'Policy Lab'-as conducted by the team at The Policy Institute at King's College London on numerous policy challenges over the past four years. Drawing on our experience in running 15 Policy Labs between January 2015 and September 2019, we (a) provide a guide to how we have run Policy Labs, while sharing our learning on what has worked best in conducting them and (b) demonstrate how these labs can contribute to bringing evidence closer to policymaking, by comparing their characteristics to enablers for doing so identified in the literature. While this approach to Policy Labs is not the only one of its kind, we suggest that these types of Labs manifest characteristics identified in previous studies for influencing the policymaking process; namely: providing a forum for open, honest conversations around a policy topic; creating new networks, collaborations and partnerships between academics and policymakers; synthesising available evidence on a policy topic in a robust and accessible format; and providing timely access to evidence relevant to a policy issue. We recognise the limitations of measuring and evaluating how these Labs change policy in the long-term and recommend viewing the Policy Lab as part of a process for engaging evidence and policymaking and not an isolated activity. This process serves to build a coalition through participation of diverse communities (thereby establishing 'trust'), work on the language and presentation of evidence (thereby enabling effective 'translation' of evidence) and engage policymakers early to respond when policy windows emerge (thereby taking into account 'timing' for creating policy action).

During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and international pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deficit reduction targets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target level. This u-turn is one of the more curious episodes in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of continuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UK's defence policy. In doing so, we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic and international factors that explain the government's apparent u-turn and what this revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

As the pro-Brexit and pro-Remain campaigns approach maximum velocity in the run-up to the in/out referendum on British membership of the European Union scheduled for 23 June 2016, vociferous debate continues over a range of critical issues. Few have been more hotly debated, along with the migrant crisis and the UK's economy, than the future of the UK's national security. Indeed, ever since David Cameron returned from Europe with his new deal, there has been something of a 'blizzard' 1 of claims and counter-claims concerning whether Britain's international status and ability to respond to existential threats, including the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and resurgent Russian nationalism, would be undermined by departure from the EU. 2 Those in the 'Remain' campaign essentially argue that leaving the EU would 'threaten' the UK's 'economic and national security'. 3 This was precisely the language used in a notable public letter to the Daily Telegraph from former chiefs of the armed services, claiming that Europe faces a series of 'grave security challenges' and that the UK is in a 'stronger' position to deal with them from inside the EU. 4 Those making up the 'Leave' campaign have argued the opposite, accusing Mr Cameron and their other opponents of egregious 'scaremongering' and 'Project Fear' tactics that exaggerate national security and economic risks if the UK were to exit the EU. 5 The UK's national security, then, is a central theme in the UK's debate over membership of the EU. One of the most important, but often overlooked, * The authors are grateful to Benjamin Kienzle for his comments on an earlier version of this article and to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. 1 Jon Hay, 'The Brexit fight is on: look to the big issues', Global Capital, 2 Feb. 2016, http://www.globalcapital. com/article/wbf49lhy8xxc/the-brexit-fight-is-on-look-to-the-big-issues. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 6 March 2016.) 2 See e.g. Nick Witney, Brexit to nowhere: the foreign policy consequences of 'out' (European Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 2015),

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Although supporting and assessing the non-academic “impact” of research are not entirely new developments in higher education, academics and research institutions are under increasing pressure to produce work that has a measurable influence outside the academy. With a view to supporting the solution of complex societal issues with evidence and expertise, and against the background of increased emphasis on impact in the United Kingdom’s 2021 Research Excellence Framework (REF2021) and a proliferation of impact guides and tools, this article offers a simple, easy to remember framework for designing impactful research. We call this framework: “The 7Cs of Impact” – Context, Communities, Constituencies, Challenge, Channels, Communication and Capture. Drawing on core elements of the Policy Institute at King’s College London’s Impact by Design training course and the authors’ practical experience in supporting and delivering impact, this paper outlines how this framework can help address key aspects across the lifecycle of a research project and plan, from identifying the intended impact of research and writing it into grants and proposals, to engaging project stakeholders and assessing whether the project has had the desired impact. While preparations for current and future REF submissions may benefit from using this framework, this paper sets out the “7Cs” with a more holistic view of impact in mind, seeking to aid researchers in identifying, capturing, and communicating how research projects can and do contribute to the improvement in society.