The Curious Incident of Mr Cameron and the United Kingdom Defence Budget: A New Legacy?

Abstract

During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and international pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deficit reduction targets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target level. This u-turn is one of the more curious episodes in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of continuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UK's defence policy. In doing so, we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic and international factors that explain the government's apparent u-turn and what this revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?

“…The UK's most recent five-yearly SDSR made no reference to the CSDP as a component of the UK's approach to providing for its national security and defence (but does stress bilateral defence and security relationships with France, Germany and Poland). 58 On the operational aspects of the CSDP, the UK has not been willing to engage at a level of significant scale and scope with CSDP military operations, and generally sees itself as having a preference for NATO-focused commitments. Consequently, London has been a modest contributor to the EU's military operations, although it has committed personnel to the majority of the EU's 'civilian' missions deployed for roles such as border observation and capacity-building for third countries.…”

Geopolitics of the 2015 British Defense White Paper and Its Historical Predecessors

“…An early 2016 scholarly assessment of the 2015 SDSR observed that the December 2015 parliamentary vote authorizing air strikes in Syria was a sign that the UK was moving from strategic shrinking to greater international engagement while also maintaining it was to early to determine if spending 2% of GDP on defense would be sufficient to meet national security aspirations. 56 Civilian and military British national security policy analysts and policymakers must engage in ongoing reviews and updates of domestic and international economics, public opinion, military capabilities, and strategic trends and developments to determine if the 2015 SDSR satisfactorily addresses Britain's emerging national security requirements.…”

Introducing Change in Public Service Organizations under Austerity: The Complex Case of the Governance of the Defence in the United Kingdom

“…Yet, what is less clear is that by choosing a planned change strategy, a new equilibrium was found. The 2015 SDSR updated version evidenced a knowable end‐stage; however, to the eyes of many commentators, it only gave continuity to the already established areas of main change: personnel reductions, revamping the MoD, and cost‐cutting waste in the overall defence governance (see Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016).…”

“…Governments balancing their budgets in a period of fiscal austerity are faced with the problems of managing delivery demands while trying to cut back the rising burden of expensive public services (Hunt 2011; McTaggart and O'Flynn 2015; Solar and Smith 2020a, 2020b). During the first half of the 2010s, for example, Western industrialized nations sought to scale down the size of defence saving on personnel, civilian workforce, equipment, and capabilities, while proposing new ways of managing the sector during austerity (see Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016; The Economist 2017; Taylor 2012). In Australia, the central government launched Project Suakin after years of inertia, to create a more flexible and adaptable defence, seeking “maximum efficiency” in the workforce (Latham and Sawyer 2014).…”

“…Scholars working in the affairs of strategic and foreign policy have since emphasized the challenges inherited by the SDSR and its updated version launched in 2015 (Dorman 2010; Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016; Hammerstad and Boas 2015; Ritchie 2011; Taylor 2012). Yet, less attention has been put on other equally relevant aspects of modern governance, especially after retrospectively viewing the government's prescriptive changes for the defence sector.…”