The two episodes of food price surges in 2007 and 2011 have been particularly challenging for developing and emerging economies' central banks and have raised the question of how monetary authorities should react to such external relative price shocks. We develop a new-Keynesian small open-economy model and show that non-food inflation is a good proxy for core inflation in high-income countries, but not for middle-income and low-income countries. Although, in these countries we find that associating non-food inflation and core inflation may be promoting badly-designed policies, and consequently central banks should target headline inflation rather than non-food inflation. This result holds because non-tradable food represents a significant share in total consumption. Indeed, the poorer the country, the higher the share of purely domestic food in consumption and the more detrimental lack of attention to the evolution in food prices.

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The enormous global demand for smartphones in recent years has created a new global tech cycle. In 2016 alone, global smartphone sales reached close to 1.5 billion, one for every fifth person on earth. In turn, this has engendered complex and evolving supply chains across Asia. We show that the new tech cycle cannot be captured by standard seasonality, but depends on smartphone product release dates. Decomposing cycle from trend, we also show that the sale of smartphones may have peaked in late 2015. Asia, however, continues to gain in importance as the global tech manufacturer.

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Based on simulations of an original DGE model of the US, Chinese and Euro area economies with financial frictions and various monetary regimes, the paper shows that the contribution of China in global rebalancing should primarily rely on structural policies aiming at reducing aggregate savings in China. The role of the exchange-rate regime would be minor under standard monetary policies, although more important if monetary policies in advanced countries are constrained, as they are today. Finally, relying only on a change in China's monetary regime (without structural reforms) could end up in delaying rather than accelerating the rebalancing, depending on China's policy regarding accumulated reserves.