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This paper examines audit report lags and eamings announcement lags for a sample of firms that switched auditors. We investigate whether audit report and earnings announcement lags are associated with the timing of auditor changes in relation to firms' fiscal year-ends. It is hypothesized that firms which replace their auditor early (late) in the fiscal year do so for positive (negative) reasons and experience shorter (longer) reporting lags. Conflicts over reporting issues can be difficult to resolve and consequently lead to reporting delays. In other cases, clients may be more concerned about adhering to customary reporting practices or improving reporting timeliness. These are likely to be considerations in auditor realignment decisions and are predictably refiected in the timing of the auditor change.Resume. Les auteurs s'interessent aux d6calages dans la production des rapports des verificateurs et dans la publication des benefices, pour un fchantillon d'entreprises ayant chang6 de vfirificateurs. Ils se demandent si ces decalages sont reliSs au choix du moment du changement de verificateurs par rapport it la date de cloture de I'exercice, Selon leur hypothfese, les entreprises qui remplacent leurs verificateurs tot (tard) dans I'exercice le font f)our des raisons positives (negatives), et les decalages enregistrds dans la production de rinformation sont plus courts (plus longs). Les confiits touchant les questions relatives & l'information h foumir peuvent etre difficiles k resoudre et, en consequence, conduire h des retards dans la publication de l'information, Dans d'autres cas, les entreprises clientes peuvent etre davantage pr6occupees par le respect des methodes coutumieres de presentation de l'information ou par l'acceMration de la publication de l'information, Ces facteurs sont susceptibles d'entrer en ligne de compte dans les decisions de reorientation des verificateurs, et il est h prevoir qu'ils se refieteront dans le choix du moment du changement de verificateurs.The empirical findings for both audit report and eamings announcement lags are consistent with the hypotheses. Despite the increase in reporting lags for late switchers, we observe a higher incidence of switching in the fourth quarter than in any other quarter. Additionally, we detect a higher percentage of losses and

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SUMMARY We respond to calls for research into the effect of the decline in the number of Big N firms on market power and consequential impact on competition (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008; European Commission 2010; U.K. House of Lords 2011) by analyzing the change in Big N audit fee premium over the Big 6, Big 5, and Big 4 periods, and across different client segments. Using a large sample of Australian publicly listed companies over the years 1996–2007, we find that while premiums paid to Big N auditors have increased significantly for the Big 4 and Big 5 periods compared to the Big 6 period, the growth has not been shared equally across all client segments. In particular, while the largest global clients pay some of the highest premiums, the increase in premiums for this group in the Big 4 period has been lower than those experienced by other clients. We also observe that premiums paid to industry specialists have declined relative to the Big 6 period, but fee discounts offered to clients switching to a Big N auditor from a non-Big N auditor have increased. In all, we find that the premiums paid by Big N clients increased in line with consolidation in the number of Big N audit firms, but the impact varied across client segments.

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