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Purpose – The strength of ties between individuals influences the speed and spread of crisis information dissemination (CID). By constructing networks of strong and weak ties, this paper aims to innovatively explore the impacts of strong and weak ties on the CID at the macro level. Design/methodology/approach – To better understand the rules of CID in different kinds of social networks, this paper constructs a CID model based on the strength of ties in social networks and cellular automation, using simulations of CID speed and spread in an entire network, strong tie network and weak tie network generated by MATLAB. Findings – As the article's major theoretical contribution, the results demonstrate that CID is more efficient in a network of weak ties than in a network of strong ties, and that the spread of CID has a positive correlation with the believability of the information disseminated and the dissemination tendency coefficient. Furthermore, the difference of dissemination speeds between strong and weak tie networks varies regularly with information believability and the dissemination tendency coefficient. Originality/value – This study provides more effective public mechanisms for rapidly evaluating the believability of crisis information and responding to crises in real time. The findings also have some valuable implications for government agencies to improve the efficiency and effect of CID.

The street protests and other mass demonstrations that have occurred frequently in recent years have resulted in considerable political pressure and have destabilized countries. How governments respond to such emergencies, and whether to evacuate protesters quickly, has been one of the most important public management challenges facing modern governments. In the case of evacuating protesters through police force, issues to consider include the cognitive differences among the conflicting parties and the cost-benefit considerations between the alternative strategies of mandatory evacuation and compromise. In this paper, the evolutionary dynamic of the mandatory evacuation of protesters by police is analyzed by extensive evolutionary game theory. Considering the cognitive differences among the conflicting parties, mental models of the interactions between government officials and protesters are constructed, which can not only avoid the uncertainty of evolutionary equilibrium but also consider the belief learning in the interior of the dynamic stage game. The evolutionary dynamic analysis of the mandatory evacuation of protesters is subsequently performed. To verify the effectiveness of the model set out, a multiagent simulation analysis based on a real case study of the Ningbo PX incident is presented. Furthermore, the decision-making related to police evacuation of protesters is based on the cost-benefit analysis between mandatory evacuation and compromise, the minimal number of police required, and the on-the-spot deployment plans of the police. The analysis shows that when facing protesters marching along a street, the evacuation measures are more effective if the police actions target the first several rows of protesters. However, in the case of protesters gathering near iconic buildings (or surrounding their demonstration leaders), the emergency plan of the mandatory evacuation of the protesters is less effective.

The problem of anti-terrorism security checks of express transportation becomes more and more severe under the Internet shopping model. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model of anti-terrorism resource allocation in express transportation security checks is built to discuss, in terms of single and multiple routes, the optimal resource allocation of express company (defender) including physical security measures, in-box sensor technology, non-intrusive security measures at terminal distribution sites and handover course. It shows that, for the single route, express company should trade off the security costs among the first, second and third level security measures, and should allocate the same security costs of physical security measures for every distribution site. For the multiple routes, the transportation route that terrorists insert the hazardous materials has the lowest probability of physical security measures, and therefore is utilized by terrorists. Thus, the optimal allocation plan of security resources should be the same security costs of non-intrusive security measures at the final distribution sites (the third level security measure) among each transportation routes.

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