PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the dividend payout behavior of Indian firms and test whether the three prominent dividend policy theories (signaling, life-cycle and catering) explain the dividend policy of Indian firms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test the three theories using the methodology based on the studies of Nissim and Ziv (2001), DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2004). For testing the signaling theory, the authors regress the change in earnings on the rate of change in dividends using the pooled and Fama–Macbeth regressions. The life cycle theory is tested by running a logistic regression of the dividend payment decision on two proxies of life-cycle measured by the ratio of earned to total equity. Finally, the catering theory tests the relationship between the decision to pay a dividend and the dividend premium.FindingsThe results based on a sample of Indian firms from 1992 to 2017 show that the dividend policy of Indian firms can be explained using the life-cycle theory. However, there is no evidence in support of the signaling and catering theories.Originality/valueIt provides insights into the dividend policy of Indian firms. Though there have been a few studies examining the dividend payout in India, none of the existing studies tests these theories of dividend payout. The existing research using the Indian data provides indirect evidence about the life-cycle theory. This study is the first one to test the application of these theories for Indian firms.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the operating performance of Indian using difference-in-difference (DD) methodology. It, further, examines whether there is a difference in the operating performance of acquirers doing partial and full acquisitions. Design/methodology/approach Four different benchmark criteria are used to select control firms, namely, size, size and industry, size and leverage, and size and book-to-market ratio. To measure the operating performance, return on assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio between earnings before depreciation, interest, tax and amortization (EBDITA) and total assets (TA), expressed in percentage. This paper examines the ROA of event and control firms for three years in each pre- and post-acquisition period and finally compares them using the DD method. Findings Using a sample of Indian acquirers, the results show that the operating performance of Indian acquirers neither improves nor deteriorates after accounting for an appropriate benchmark. Operating performance of event firms significantly reduces in the post-acquisition period. However, non-acquiring firms of similar size and pre-operating performance also exhibit similar results. Finally results show that, the operating performance of acquirers making full acquisitions deteriorates. Originality/value It provides insights into the operating performance of Indian acquirers with an improved methodology, which accounts for the performance of control firms. The author also uses multiple matching criteria to find control firms to overcome the possible bias of the results dependent on the matching criteria. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the author could not find other studies comparing the operating performance of acquirers making partial and full acquisitions.

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We examine the impact of the failure of Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (“Satyam”), a major corporate governance related event in India, on related party loans of Indian public companies. Using data from a balanced panel of 794 firms for the years 2006–2012, we find that the Satyam failure had a significant negative impact on related party loans given by Indian firms. The average of net related party loans (as a proportion of total assets) declined from 2.37% in 2008 to 0.23% in 2010. Furthermore, the reduction in related party loans was more prominent in firms with lower levels of external monitoring. Finally, since prior research suggests that there was no significant Satyam effect on the frequency or attendance at audit committee meetings, our results suggest that there can be substantive changes in operational decisions without observable changes in governance.