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Previous research has described, theoretically and empirically, the negative consequences of a politicized civil service, recruited on political instead of professional merits. However, we know very little about what explains politicization, especially outside the context of the USA. This study reviews literature in the field and identifies three commonly used explanations that are then tested in a study of recruitment of agency heads in Sweden between 1960 and 2010. For this purpose, we collected new data that includes information about 1,812 agency heads' political and/or professional backgrounds and 1,608 appointments to agency head positions. Our study demonstrates that none of the previously used explanations – ideological bias of the government, the number of years that the government has been in power, and the parliamentarian support for the government – holds. Our general conclusion is therefore negative and emphasizes the need for more systematic research on this question.

There is an extensive literature on the proliferation of agencies and the delegation of authority to such bodies across different countries. Much of this research asks whether New Public Management (NPM)-style agencification reforms have been implemented according to the original objectives, and what consequences-intended or unintended-the reforms have produced. Yet much of this research lacks an explicit link to the literature on the policymaking functions of public bureaucracies and their interactions with elected politicians. What are the consequences of agencification for the policy process at large? What policy relevant tasks do agencies perform, to what extent are they involved in policy-making, and what factors influence the quality and quantity of their participation? This introductory article gives an overview of key concepts such as ''public agencies'' and ''policy autonomy'' and the research literature. Moreover, it critically discusses relevant theoretical perspectives, outlines the articles included in this themed issue and argues for a more systematic and theoretically guided analysis of agencies' role in policy-making.

There is limited empirical research on the extent to which politicized recruitment of ministerial advisers affects the quality of the policy process. In this article we take a novel step by looking at two possible consequences of increased political recruitment for the policy process: administrative politicization and contestability. We deploy a Most Similar Systems comparison of Denmark and Sweden and include survey answers from 657 civil servants in managerial positions. We find that political recruitment of top civil servants, such as Swedish state secretaries, restricts the access of the civil service to the minister, but it does not substantially politicize the policy process. Danish civil servants perceive themselves as more contested by the relatively few Danish political advisers than their Swedish colleagues. Our results imply that the organization of political advice is a crucial factor for politicization and contestability

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