This paper aims to examine the role performed by representatives of institutional investors in environmental reporting in Spain, where the presence of this type of director is the highest among European countries. Additionally, we make a distinction between those representatives of institutional investors appointed by bank and insurance companies and those appointed by mutual funds, investment funds and pension funds, because they have different motivations, characteristics and incentives, and consequently their role on boards and their influence on environmental disclosure may be dissimilar, as our results suggest. Our research offers a deep analysis revealing the role played by representatives of institutional investors in Spanish listed firms' decisions to disclose environmental information. Thus, our findings show the engagement with the stakeholders of a particular type of director on boards regarding environmental disclosure.

We aim to explore whether board gender diversity—specifically, women directors representing institutional ownership—improves the sustainability development of listed firms by affecting corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. Moreover, among female directors representing institutional shareholders, we can differentiate between those working for banks and insurance companies (pressure‐sensitive female institutional directors) and those working for mutual funds, investment funds, pension funds, and venture capital firms (pressure‐resistant female institutional directors). The effect of these categories of directors on CSR policies is also analysed. Our evidence suggests that women directors representing institutional ownership positively affect CSR policies, which is the same as for pressure‐resistant female institutional directors, and pressure‐sensitive institutional directors do not impact CSR policies. This research provides a new framework for the role played by certain types of female directors (female institutional directors, female pressure‐sensitive directors, and female pressure‐resistant directors) in relation to CSR policies, and thus, it may help policymakers to promote CSR policies and to take action to promote responsible behaviour among listed firms.

This paper aims at analyzing how controlling shareholders' representatives on boards impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (disclosing CSR matters) in Spain, a context characterized by high ownership concentration, one-tier boards, little board independence, weak legal protection for investors and the presence of large shareholders, especially institutional shareholders. Furthermore, among controlling shareholders' representatives, we can distinguish between those appointed by insurance companies and banks and those appointed by mutual funds, investment funds and pension funds. The effect of these categories of directors on CSR strategies is, therefore, also analyzed. Our findings suggest that controlling shareholders' representatives have a positive effect on CSR strategies, as do directors appointed by investment funds, pension funds and mutual funds, while directors appointed by banks and insurance companies have no impact on CSR strategies. This analysis offers new insights into the role played by certain types of directors on CSR strategies.

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