This article tests the separation of ownership and control in South African-listed companies that leads to the divergence of interest between shareholders and directors. Where listed companies are owned by so many shareholders that their diffused shareholding results in negligible control over the directors who manage the assets of the company, it is likely that the directors will manage and direct the company to maximise their self-interest to the detriment of the interest of the shareholders. The separation of ownership and control and the maximisation of self-interest are central themes in the agency theory. Researching their validity in a South African context where the market is less liquid and the stock exchange is significantly smaller can add a valuable contribution to the continuing debate on corporate governance in the country.The article analyses 186 listed South African companies using data extracted over four years to test whether there is separation of ownership and control and whether such separation leads to the maximisation of self-interest. Data were extracted for the years 2005 and 2006, using the shareholding in 2006 to determine control, and for the years 2009 and 2010, using the shareholding in 2010 to determine control. Directors' remuneration as a percentage of assets was used as a proxy for the maximisation of directors' interest, and profit attributable to shareholders as a percentage of assets was used as a proxy for the maximisation of shareholders' interest. These proxies were used to test the impact of control during the two controlling periods, namely 2006 and 2010.The article finds that the majority of listed companies in South Africa are controlled by a dominant shareholder. However, there are still a significant number of companies where the directors have de facto control. Contrary to the expectation that companies controlled by directors will aim to maximise directors' remuneration, or companies controlled by shareholders will aim to maximise profit attributable to shareholders, this article finds the opposite to be true. This is possibly an indication that the controlling parties might consider factors other than their direct financial self-interest, or that there is an inherent cost associated with control.

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The paper presents secondary empirical data from the Common Body of Knowledge study, on the use of audit tools and techniques by internal auditors in South Africa and compared its findings on South African internal audit functions with those of developed regions. It investigates the current use of the audit tools and techniques by the internal auditors in South Africa. This paper also reviewed relevant literature to support arguments for the use of audit tools and techniques by the internal auditors. The study found that internal audit functions in South Africa use audit tools and techniques similar to that of developed regions. The paper also found that internal auditors mostly use audit tools and techniques, such as risk based planning electronic, communication, analytical reviews and working papers. The paper concludes that, while other audit tools and techniques are important to have, the most preferred enhances the quality of the audit process.

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The internal audit function is increasingly recognised as an important internal governance mechanism and consequently factors that contribute to its effectiveness are now an area of great interest to researchers and practitioners. This study draws on signalling theory to fill a gap in the internal audit effectiveness (IAE) literature by investigating which IAE signals are sent by large South African companies in their company reports. Using a self-developed IAE signalling frame, a content analysis was performed on the integrated reports and other annual reports of the top 100 listed companies in South Africa over a five-year period. Thereafter a multiple correspondence analysis was used to extract IAE signals. The results revealed that IAE disclosure patterns of South African listed companies follow the normative dictates of the King Code and the Companies Act. The study also discovered a low average IAE disclosure rate linked to non-mandatory disclosure requirements. Disclosing more detail on IAE represents a missed opportunity to signal superiority through voluntary communication of the IAE signals especially on internal aspects such as management support for internal audit recommendations and the continuous professional development of internal auditors.