This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ (a cousin of the problem of instantiation). This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs (instantiations of properties and relations) are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity.

I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal, external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy is basic, it is not found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of metaphysics, I also argue that only external relations are ontologically fundamental.

Santos et al ( 2020) is an extremely interesting paper on the relationship between technology and work, examined in light of developments of AI, automation and robotics that point towards future scenarios where work might be superfluous. Specifically, on this background, the authors pose their provocative title-question 'Should humans work?' Their main message is that the issues surrounding this question have been muddled, mainly due to a failure to keep separate two aspects of the notion of work. The first aspect is what one might call the 'philosophical' aspect -the one that involves 'meaning' and 'purpose' by providing meaning and purpose to people's lives through their work. The second aspect is the 'technical' aspect,

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On the notion of responsibility employed by John Passmore in his classic Man's Responsibility for Nature, the relationship of responsibility can only hold between persons (human beings, subjects), or groups and communities of them, and other persons. And in this relationship the persons that are responsible to other persons are responsible for how their actions affect these other persons, not to the direct object of these actions (in this case: nature). If this is correct, we cannot be responsible to nature without conceiving of it as a 'pseudo-person', as Passmore calls it. However, non-anthropocentric environmental ethics requires such a moral relationship. The question is, therefore, how this can be allowed in a metaphysically acceptable way. To answer this I first provide an account of what it means to stand in the relation of being 'responsible to'. Next, I describe two major paradigmatic examples of the metaphysics of nature that perfectly match the thesis that we can, and should, be responsible to nature (the Spinoza-inspired view and the Gaia hypothesis). Unfortunately, they have to be rejected for common sense or naturalist reasons. Finally, I therefore defend a fictionalist view of nature (as person-like) that allows for this relationship.