For more information on this publication, visit http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. R® is a registered trademark Limited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org iii AbstractIf outer space becomes an active theater of war, the impact to daily life on earth would be substantial. Unintended consequences of attacks in space are hard to contain and are not always readily reversible-debris or radiation generating attacks render specific orbits unusable, not just for the duration of the war, but for the foreseeable future. With the loss of those orbits, our lives would be very different-accurate weather maps, overhead imagery, access to breaking international news, and navigation services that guide our cars, airplanes, and ships would all disappear. Even in the absence of catastrophic attacks, war in space would have a chilling effect on commercial uses. Deploying new capability in space is risky, and war would make it infinitely more so. Space entrepreneurship would grind to a halt, denying mankind capabilities we have yet to dream of.In this dissertation, I use a game theoretic model of space war to examine how sentiments in multiple dimensions impact state decisions regarding whether to expand a ground war into the space domain. Key innovations of this model are a) the use of prospect theory in lieu of rational choice and b) the assumption of non-unitary actors with independent sentiments regarding different dimensions of national interests. I offer a new way to visualize and think about how sentiment impacts the ability to tailor a deterrence strategy to specific circumstances. These innovations enable a rich exploration of how space war might play out across a wide range of futures. Based on that exploration, I recommend specific steps spacefaring nations should take to robustly deter the expansion of wars into the space domain. My recommendations are applicable across a wide range of opponent capabilities and sentiments under bo...

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. : 978-1-9774-0047-5 For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2023 ISBNPublished by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark.Cover photo: AleksandarNakic, Getty Images.iii PrefaceThe RAND National Defense Research Institute assisted the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in understanding how its workforce can work in unclassified environments, including outside Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs). This is the first of two reports from the project, and it examines literature about telework and telework practices from across government agencies. This report will be of interest to government leaders who are currently implementing telework or considering implementing telework. The report identifies technological, legal, policy, financial, and security considerations and examines lessons learned from seven different agencies. RAND selected federal agencies that had telework programs in place, agencies whose employees handle sensitive or classified information, and agencies with data publicly available about these programs. This research was sponsored by the Human Development Directorate at NGA and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally iv Understanding Government Telework funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. RAND partnered with the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University in conducting the research for this report.For more information on the RAND Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/intel or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage). SummaryAcross ...

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