The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently proposed amendments to the standard audit report that would require the disclosure of critical audit matters (CAMs), and the Securities and Exchange Commission continues to evaluate the use of principles-based (imprecise) accounting standards within U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. We assert that jurors perceive precise accounting standards to constrain auditors' control over financial reporting outcomes, resulting in a lower propensity for negligence verdicts when the accounting treatment conforms to the precise standard. However, we hypothesize that the use of either imprecise standards or CAMs reduces the extent to which jurors perceive this constraint to exist, leading to increased auditor liability. We present experimental evidence supporting this argument. Our results highlight the similarities between the effects of imprecise accounting standards and CAMs on negligence assessments. These results provide insight for regulators and the auditing profession about the potential consequences of the proposed regulatory changes.

We examine the value relevance of a comprehensive set of summary performance measures including sales, earnings, comprehensive income, and operating cash flows. We find that, while value relevance peaks for measures “above the line,” no single measure dominates around the world. Instead, a measure is more relevant when it captures, directly and quickly, information about firms’ cash flows. Specifically, for each performance measure by country, we estimate eight attributes commonly used to assess earnings quality. We find these attributes highly correlated—most of their variance is explained by only two principal factors. A factor capturing articulation with cash flows is positively associated with a measure’s value relevance; a factor reflecting the measure’s persistence, predictability, smoothness, and conservatism is negatively associated. Our results suggest that, when it comes to equity valuation, accounting researchers and standard-setters should focus not on what performance measure is “best” at a given point in time, but on the underlying attributes that investors find most relevant.

This paper provides evidence on how the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) generates accounting standards in the presence of lobbyists with differing preferences. I develop hypotheses regarding the associations between attributes of lobbyists and their lobbying activity, and their lobbying success. I find that lobbying success is positively related to the ability of the lobbyist to provide information to the IASB; however, this success is dependent on the credibility of the lobbyist. I also find evidence that lobbying success is associated with the impact that the lobbyists have on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the size of the capital market in their home country. However, this association is not present when I look only at cases where lobbyists disagree with IASB proposal drafts. This evidence is useful in evaluating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent considerations regarding the adoption of IFRS by the U.S., as well as the recent change in the structure of the IASB that requires a defined geographic mix of board members by the year 2012. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the paper.

SUMMARY The U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently proposed changes to the audit reporting model that would require auditors to disclose areas of high audit risk within the audit report. Concerns about the proposal's potential to increase auditor liability have been raised by practitioners and highlighted in the business press. In this paper, we review five recent experiments that directly relate to these concerns, identify patterns in the results, and discuss the implications of these findings for regulators and practitioners.

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