Sunk costs are irrecoverable investments that should not influence decisions, because decisions should be made on the basis of expected future consequences. Both human and nonhuman animals can show sensitivity to sunk costs, but reports from across species are inconsistent. In a temporal context, a sensitivity to sunk costs arises when an individual resists ending an activity, even if it seems unproductive, because of the time already invested. In two parallel foraging tasks that we designed, we found that mice, rats, and humans show similar sensitivities to sunk costs in their decision-making. Unexpectedly, sensitivity to time invested accrued only after an initial decision had been made. These findings suggest that sensitivity to temporal sunk costs lies in a vulnerability distinct from deliberation processes and that this distinction is present across species.

Current theories of deliberative decision making suggest that deliberative decisions arise from imagined simulations that require interactions between the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus. In rodent navigation experiments, hippocampal theta sequences advance from the location of the rat ahead to the subsequent goal. To examine the role of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) on the hippocampus, we disrupted the mPFC with DREADDs (designer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs). Using the Restaurant Row foraging task, we found that mPFC disruption resulted in decreased vicarious trial and error behavior, reduced the number of theta sequences, and impaired theta sequences in hippocampus. mPFC disruption led to larger changes in the initiation of the hippocampal theta sequences that represent the current location of the rat rather than to the later portions that represent the future outcomes. These data suggest that the mPFC likely provides an important component to the initiation of deliberative sequences and provides support for an episodic-future thinking, working memory interpretation of deliberation. NEW & NOTEWORTHY The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and hippocampus interact during deliberative decision making. Disruption of the mPFC impaired hippocampal processes, including the local and nonlocal representations of space along each theta cycle and the initiation of hippocampal theta sequences, while sparing place cell firing characteristics and phase precession. mPFC disruption reduced the deliberative behavioral process vicarious trial and error and improved economic behaviors on this task.

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Navigation can be accomplished through multiple decision-making strategies, using different information-processing computations. A well-studied dichotomy in these decision-making strategies compares hippocampal-dependent "place" and dorsal-lateral striatal-dependent "response" strategies. A place strategy depends on the ability to flexibly respond to environmental cues, while a response strategy depends on the ability to quickly recognize and react to situations with welllearned action -outcome relationships. When rats reach decision points, they sometimes pause and orient toward the potential routes of travel, a process termed vicarious trial and error (VTE). VTE co-occurs with neurophysiological information processing, including sweeps of representation ahead of the animal in the hippocampus and transient representations of reward in the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. To examine the relationship between VTE and the place/response strategy dichotomy, we analyzed data in which rats were cued to switch between place and response strategies on a plus maze. The configuration of the maze allowed for place and response strategies to work competitively or cooperatively. Animals showed increased VTE on trials entailing competition between navigational systems, linking VTE with deliberative decision-making. Even in a well-learned task, VTE was preferentially exhibited when a spatial selection was required, further linking VTE behavior with decision-making associated with hippocampal processing.