No abstract

While many scholars have posited a simultaneous relationship between trade and conflict, very few empirical studies have specified the relationship as such. Those that did employed samples that were relatively limited in spatial-temporal coverage. None have employed conflict indicators based on Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data due to the difficulty of including discrete dependent variables in a simultaneous equation framework. We overcome both limitations in this study and offer results with important theoretical implications. In line with the most recent published studies, we design our model to "condition" the estimates on recent histories of dyadic trade and conflict. We apply Maddala's estimator, which is designed for a two-equation system in which one endogenous variable is continuous and the other is dichotomous. While the signs of all control variable coefficients match those reported in mainstream trade-conflict literature, our main result does not. We find what we call the "primacy of politics"; i.e., that conflict indeed inhibits trade while the effect of dyadic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict is statistically insignificant. Extensive sensitivity analyses show the results to be consistent across estimators as well as alternative model specifications and trade data sets. We conclude that liberal claims about interdependence and conflict may be problematic.The relationship between economic interdependence and interstate armed conflict continues to fuel lively debates among scholars. The majority of published empirical studies support the liberal position that trade reduces conflict, though some scholars challenge this claim directly and others argue that contingencies and boundary conditions still need to be specified (Mansfield and Pollins 2001). Importantly, there is agreement that the relationship may well be reciprocal (that is, trade affects conflict and conflict moves trade), yet there is very little work to date which takes this possibility into account. Almost all published studies to date estimate the relationship in single-equation form. That is, the study looks only at how trade influences conflict, or it examines only the effect of conflict on trade-

A public choice approach is used to build a model of bilateral trade flows employing international conflict and cooperation, as well as prices and income, to predict the level of imports. The model is consistent with neoclassical trade theory in economics, while employing data and measurement insights from the field of international relations to construct an indicator of bilateral diplomatic relations. The model is empirically tested using pooled, cross-section time-series analysis for six nations representing different worlds of development. Considerable empirical support is found for the model in general. The effects of diplomacy on commerce are significant and conform to model predictions in every instance. Estimation results also indicate possible cross-national differences in the political management of trade relations.

Several recent explanations for major-power war focus on purported cycles in global economic activity or in global political order. I shall argue that a better understanding of interrelationships among the economic long wave, the global leadership cycle, and armed conflict can be gained if we (1) expand the study of interstate conflict beyond the limited domain of great power or systemic wars and (2) treat the long wave and the leadership cycle as quasi-independent and interrelated processes, each contributing to the conflict dynamics of the interstate system. Theoretical foundations for these two recommendations are drawn from the core works in this field. A model based on this new approach is developed and tested empirically along with four formal representations of the core frameworks. Poisson regression is employed using data on interstate disputes (1816–1976) to test resulting hypotheses. Analysis shows that broadening the explanatory domains of existing frameworks is valid and that the “coevolving systems” model is measurably superior to all tested competitors. I conclude that these two global processes are best viewed as coevolving systems and that future studies of systemic conflict should take this approach.

A burgeoning literature has emerged on the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict. This literature is evaluated, and three issues are raised for future research. First, there is a need to improve the theoretical basis of claims about the influence of interdependence on conflict and to specify more clearly the causal mechanisms underlying any such relationship. Second, future research should identify the boundary conditions of the effects of interdependence on conflict. Third, much more attention must be paid to the definition and measurement of interdependence and conflict.