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Previous studies have largely overlooked three key components of a scandal that could determine how it shapes election outcomes: the extent to which it is covered in the media, the potential that donors respond differently than voters, and the likelihood that the impact of scandals have changed over time. Examining U.S. House scandals between 1980 and 2010, we find that while scandal-tainted politicians receive fewer votes and are less likely to win than otherwise similar legislators not embroiled in scandal, donors actually contribute more money to their campaigns after the scandal’s revelation. Both of these effects, however, are limited to financial and sex scandals that garnered national media attention. Moreover, we find that voters are less punitive and donors are even more supportive in the post-1994 period of nationalized electoral politics.

Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italyresearch indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to italy's legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption-but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office-and reducing corruption-and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.

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