In understanding Malaysia's surprise 14th General Election, this article argues for the need to rethink how we understand elections. We need to bring together macro socio-political forces with more micro-level evolving phenomena in the campaign, within political institutions, and in voting behaviour. Rather than buck international trends, Malaysia's sociopolitical conditions before the election – political polarisation, a rise of anger, increasing economic vulnerabilities, as well as increased nationalist and populist sentiments – echoed global trends and served as fertile ground for political change. It was however three sufficient conditions that brought about the political breakthrough: the impact of emotional campaigning through social media, the deinstitutionalisation of the dominant Malay party, United Malays National Organisation, and the failure to win over young voters – all factors that tie closely with the macro forces shaping the country. Given the factors that shaped the electoral outcome and Malaysia's “saviour politics,” it is suggested that the government turnover was more about breaking with the past than embracing democracy. As such, there will be constraints placed on expanding democracy going forward.

Despite losing the popular vote, Malaysia’s long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) triumphed again in the country’s 2013 elections, disappointing an emboldened opposition that had high hopes after a strong performance in 2008. Why and how did Najib and the BN win? What do the answers to those questions mean for his government and for democracy in Malaysia? In many ways, the 2013 polls typify those of competitive authoritarian systems, in which incumbents use finely honed tactics and institutional leverage to stay in office. But the 2013 general election also revealed social forces pushing for greater democracy. The nature of BN’s victory, the voting patterns, and the broader political forces within society point to continuing pressures for further democratization and high levels of political contestation in the future.

The authors’ empirical analysis shows both commonalities and variations in the sources of regime support in Southeast Asian countries. Most regimes in the region draw political legitimacy from perceptions that their governance is effective and marked by integrity. These findings lend support to the argument that regime legitimacy—when it is won and when it is lost—is rooted in the output side of the political system. Yet delivering economic prosperity alone will not suffice. In order for political regimes in Southeast Asia to win over their people, they must control corruption, respect the rule of law, treat all citizens fairly and equally, expand public services, and be responsive to what the people need. The region’s young democracies are not exempt from these requirements.

From horrific accounts of men decapitated to “ordinary” accounts of stolen motorcycles, the routine beating and killing of alleged criminals by mobs (massa) has become common in Indonesia. This article examines the patterns ofkeroyokan—mobbing—from 1995 through 2004 in four provinces and highlights the temporal, spatial, and substantive variations of this phenomenon. Drawing from a database of provincial and local news clippings in Bali, Bengkulu, West Java, and South Kalimantan and in-depth case studies and interviews, this article shows that mobbing varies considerably. Its causes are nationalandlocal. The temporal data show that nationally the most important factor to influence levels of mobbing was the introduction of decentralization. The power vacuum that resulted from the policy decision to transfer authority from the center to localities increased local violence. Yet this macrolevel explanation is inadequate to show the spatial variation and different forms of mobbing violence. To understand the causes of these dimensions of variation, one has to move away from macronational approaches measuring violence and include a more microethnographic local approach. A richer understanding of mobbing must be locally rooted. This article uses three case studies to illustrate the centrality of local factors affecting this form of violence. The case studies suggest that mobbing is shaped by the acquiescence of actors in local communities and local learning. The article draws attention to the need to incorporate local data and methods into an analysis of violence in Indonesia and to appreciate varied daily rituals of violence as reservoirs of conflict.

This article examines East Asians and Chinese nationals who select 'China as a model' of development. The analysis looks at both macro and micro explanations to show that China's standing as a development model is not in sync with its status as a rising global and regional power. At the macro level, the focus is on country-level patterns, while the micro analysis is drawn from the third wave surveys of the Asia Barometer Survey data conducted from 2011 to 2013 in 13 different countries. The findings suggest that political values, history, geography and socio-economic conditions correspond to different views of China as a model and that those outside of China who select the country as a model are quite different from those in China itself.In this age where China is staking its claim as a world superpower and its influence is extending globally, its model of development, known as the 'China model', is being touted as an alternative development trajectory. This model at its core broadly involves a pattern of authoritarian state capitalist-led development. Yet, there is no unanimity over the 'China model' as it is heavily debated among scholars and development practitioners. The origins of the scholarly debates began with discussions of the 'Beijing consensus' in 2004 with attention to economic development, and have extended more recently into the non-democratic and institutional political features of China's political system. There is significant variation on what the 'China model' actually is and how it should be perceived both globally and within China. In these discussions, there is a missing element-an analysis of how the East Asian public, especially the Chinese themselves, view China as a model for development. We know very little of the extent to which ordinary citizens in Asia favorably consider China as a model and why. Do ordinary citizens actually see China as a development model to follow? Are there differences among