How should we understand why firms exist? A prevailing view has been that they serve to keep in check the transaction costs arising from the self-interested motivations of individuals. We develop in this article the argument that what firms do better than markets is the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups within an organization. This knowledge consists of information (e.g., who knows what) and of know-how (e.g., how to organize a research team). What is central to our argument is that knowledge is held by individuals, but is also expressed in regularities by which members cooperate in a social community (i.e., group, organization, or network). If knowledge is only held at the individual level, then firms could change simply by employee turnover. Because we know that hiring new workers is not equivalent to changing the skills of a firm, an analysis of what firms can do must understand knowledge as embedded in the organizing principles by which people cooperate within organizations. Based on this discussion, a paradox is identified: efforts by a firm to grow by the replication of its technology enhances the potential for imitation. By considering how firms can deter imitation by innovation, we develop a more dynamic view of how firms create new knowledge. We build up this dynamic perspective by suggesting that firms learn new skills by recombining their current capabilities. Because new ways of cooperating cannot be easily acquired, growth occurs by building on the social relationships that currently exist in a firm. What a firm has done before tends to predict what it can do in the future. In this sense, the cumulative knowledge of the firm provides options to expand in new but uncertain markets in the future. We discuss at length the example of the make/buy decision and propose several testable hypotheses regarding the boundaries of the firm, without appealing to the notion of “opportunism.”

Abstract.Characteristics of nationalcultureshavefrequentlybeen claimed to influence the selection of entry modes. This article investigatesthis claim by developinga theoreticalargumentfor why cultureshouldinfluencethe choiceof entry. Two hypotheses arederivedwhichrelatecultureto entrymodechoice,onefocussing on the culturaldistancebetweencountries,the other on attitudes towardsuncertaintyavoidance.Using a multinomiallogit model and controllingfor other effects, the hypothesesare tested by analyzingdata on 228 entries into the United States market by acquisition, whollyownedgreenfield,andjoint venture.Empirical supportfor the effectof nationalcultureon entrychoiceis found.

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