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We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.

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In this chapter, we summarize the main results of a recent empirical research concerning European banks. We first explore the main drivers of the differences in risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across a sample of fifty large European banking groups. We then assess the impact of RWA-based capital regulations on those banks’ asset allocations in 2008–14. We find that risk weights are affected by bank size, business models, and asset mix. We also find that the adoption of internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches is an important driver of RWAs and that national segmentations explain a significant (albeit decreasing) share of the variability in risk weights. As for the impact of internal ratings on banks’ asset allocation in 2008–14, we uncover that banks using IRB approaches more extensively have reduced more (or increased less) their corporate loan portfolio. This effect is somewhat stronger for banks located in Eurozone periphery countries during the 2010–12 sovereign crisis. We do not find evidence, however, of internal models producing a reallocation from corporate loans to government exposures, suggesting that other motives prevailed in driving banks towards sovereign bonds during the Eurozone sovereign crisis, including the so-called ‘financial repression’ channel.

Abstract. In this note we prove that a locally graded group G in which all proper subgroups are (nilpotent of class not exceeding n)-by-Černikov, is itself (nilpotent of class not exceeding n)-by-Černikov.As a preparatory result that is used for the proof of the former statement in the case of a periodic group, we also prove that a group G, containing a nilpotent of class n subgroup of finite index, also contains a characteristic subgroup of finite index that is nilpotent of class not exceeding n.2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 20F19. Secondary 20F22.